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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Introduction 
 
Terms of reference 
1. The Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research was asked to undertake a 
scoping study into the potential for using fiscal instruments to help tackle the problem of 
affordability in the housing market. 
 
Approach 
2. The research was undertaken in two stages:  
 
a review of the full range of possibilities based on secondary source material and a 
questionnaire to international experts; and 
 
a more detailed analysis of a short list of proposals examining their potential 
attributes, operation, impact and additionality, based on economic principles and 
national and international evidence and leading to advice as to the policies to be 
taken forward. 
 
Principles 
3. The effectiveness of any instrument depends on certain basic market and administrative 
attributes. The principles suggest that demand and supply subsidies can give equivalent 
benefits.  However there are good reasons in the UK context, especially given the emphasis 
on non-profit suppliers, to concentrate more on supply subsidies.   
 
4. Both demand and particularly supply are price inelastic so there will always by some loss of 
benefit into higher prices.  The cross elasticities between different sub-markets (e.g. social 
housing and lower-cost home-ownership provision) is less well understood but will also 
reduce net benefits.  Concentrating on policies that can bring net additional land into 
affordable housing provision is likely to generate the highest longer-term benefits. 
 
5. All policies will have some associated deadweight loss—that is, some actors who did not 
require the subsidy will benefit.  Social Housing Grant provides deep subsidy for those in 
particular need.  Fiscal instruments will normally provide less subsidy per unit and are 
therefore likely to be more appropriate for intermediate markets – including different forms 
of owner-occupation as well as rented property, especially for those entering the housing 
market for the first time. 
 
Developing a short list 
 
6. A typology of instruments was developed categorising possible measures into demand- and 
supply-side approaches against tax, subsidy and regulation. 
 
7. The UK position with respect to this typology was then set out.  The UK has very few fiscal 
instruments specifically addressing affordable housing.  The majority of assistance is in the 
form of direct income, rent or equity and supply subsidies.  Regulation is important in the 
form of rent controls in the social sector and S106 agreements to generate new affordable 
housing. 
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8. Across the world almost every possible type of fiscal instrument, and indeed regulation, can 
be found – including in particular depreciation allowances, tax credits, preferential 
treatment of housing-related savings, as well as interest-rate subsidies and grants for house 
purchase, new build and renovation.  
 
9. The agreed short-list took account of the international evidence and of the UK-specific 
environment and experience.  Six fiscal instruments and associated measures were included 
for further analysis: 
 
• Tax incentives for construction of affordable housing, allowing a percentage of costs to be 
set against other income or against tax due. These incentives could be applied to provision 
of rented or owner-occupied housing, to shared-equity schemes, and/or to particular areas, 
types of dwelling or occupant categories. 
 
• An instrument, similar to Homebuy and the Starter Homes Initiative, that would not be 
limited to helping buyers with first purchases, but would concentrate assistance in high-
price areas.  This might be targeted at particular geographical areas or groups of people. 
 
• Savings schemes for first-time buyers, which might include an employer element - 
including for instance allowing reliefs equivalent to pensions for mortgage savings. 
 
• Fiscal instruments to increase employer involvement in housing provision, either directly or 
indirectly. In part this would reintroduce an old established policy and make it tax efficient 
for employers to play a direct role in assisting their workers.   Guidance on the “best 
consideration” rule would also be assessed. 
 
• Ways of encouraging mixed-use or housing-only development on sites previously 
designated for non-residential development.  
 
• Reduction of VAT on renovation of affordable housing (perhaps in the first instance by 
exempting Registered Social Landlords (RSLs)). 
 
In-depth analysis of policies 
 
Policy 1: Tax incentives for construction 
10. The majority of experience on tax incentives for construction of affordable housing comes 
from the US Low Income Housing Tax Credit programme.  A stream of credits is provided 
to developers building housing that will remain affordable (as defined by income group) for 
a set period of time.  These incentives can be sold on, capitalising the benefits. 
 
11. The evidence suggested that the credits have been effective but inefficient in terms of 
transactions and other costs. The depth of subsidy is a matter for decision, but in the UK 
context could be the marginal income-tax or corporation-tax rate. 
 
12. The subsidy in England could be equity-based, covering rental property or the equity 
proportion of shared equity.  The programme could also be designed to cover loans.  The 
instrument could be used, probably together with measures to expand land supply (Policy 5) 
and employers as relevant partners, to generate significant additional affordable housing.  
There could be significant costs in terms of crowding out market housing and transactions 
costs.  The Business Expansion Scheme and assured-tenancy accelerated-depreciation 
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schemes provide some evidence on how such a scheme might work in the UK.   DTLR 
could undertake the relevant designations. 
 
Policy 2:  Government assistance to purchasers  in high-cost areas 
13. This would be an extension of existing policies including Homebuy and the Starter Home 
Initiative.  It directly addresses the problems which arise because house prices vary more 
than incomes across the country and is a cheaper approach than varying public-sector 
salaries. 
 
14. The depth of subsidy is a matter for decision.  The case for providing a more coherent set of 
polices is strong.  However targeting is important – the less well the subsidy is targeted, the 
greater the deadweight loss.  There will also be an impact on prices unless supply-side 
questions can also be addressed.  This policy can be concentrated on particular groups and 
areas and varied in relation to economic conditions.  The scheme is likely to remain cash 
limited. 
 
Policy 3:  Savings schemes for first-time buyers  
15. Such schemes have become tax inefficient in the UK because the ‘subsidy’ is regarded as 
taxable income and there is little reason to tie savings particularly to housing.  There is 
some evidence that a range of employers would wish to reintroduce these schemes were 
they to be tax efficient.  They would probably prefer to assist with mortgage payments if 
such payments were tax efficient, as they are in many other countries. 
 
16. The depth of subsidy is determined by the saver’s marginal tax rate – which is likely to be 
the standard rate.  It can only be targeted by defining groups.  This might be difficult to 
police and could go against other legislation.  Employers can be of relevance here – 
especially if it were agreed that pension-style reliefs would be available or that the early 
years of a pension could be used for house purchase. 
 
Policy 4:  Employer involvement 
17. This is more a mechanism by which the fiscal incentives above can be delivered, since 
employers can already set any payments to employees against costs.  They may, however, 
have important roles in developing savings schemes, reducing mortgage costs, helping with 
shared-equity arrangements and perhaps making land available. 
 
18. There is evidence that employers would like to provide assistance with savings and 
mortgage costs but are discouraged by the employees’ tax position. 
 
19. On the supply side, employers would normally be expected to work in partnership with 
RSLs and developers and to purchase nomination rights either for rented property or shared 
equity.  They would normally be looking for ways to keep the property as affordable 
housing into the longer term. They could be important players in the introduction of Policy 
1. In addition many employers, particularly in the public sector, may be able to offer land 
rather than direct payments, especially if it were clear that ‘best consideration’ included 
assistance with the provision of accommodation at below-market prices. 
 
20. Important practical issues relate to ensuring transparency with respect to the principles of 
best consideration and helping to develop workable larger-scale shared-equity instruments. 
It should be noted that equity-sharing schemes have not been popular with consumers in the 
past. 
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Policy 5:  Providing affordable housing on nonresidential land  
21. This is fundamentally a planning issue.  The most obvious way forward would be through 
an extension of the rural exceptions policy to urban areas and of S106 for affordable 
housing to nonresidential land.  Such a policy is foreshadowed in the Planning Regulations 
green paper. It would probably be unpopular with landowners and developers unless there 
were additional fiscal incentives as under Policy 1.  On the other hand, it would remove a 
distortion which currently provides a disincentive to residential development. 
 
22. There could be benefits in the context of large-scale urban redevelopment schemes, in 
achieving mixed-development objectives, and perhaps making it easier to raise institutional 
funding.   
 
Policy 6: VAT reduction for renovation of affordable housing 
 
23. VAT reduction restricted to RSLs would make Social Housing Grant (SHG) go further.   It 
might also be possible to cover property on longer leases (e.g., at least five years) from the 
private rented sector, helping to bring property back into use. 
 
Overall assessment 
 
24. A version of Policy 1 has just been introduced in the form of the Community Investment 
Tax Credit.  This makes it easier to develop a broader scheme concentrating on particular 
areas, dwelling types and occupant groups.  It will work effectively only if the credits can 
be traded and land supply can be increased. 
 
25. Extending Homebuy and the Starter Homes Initiative into a more coherent but carefully 
targeted scheme appears appropriate, as it can help fulfill reasonable aspirations of lower- 
income employed households. 
 
26. Savings schemes can only provide very limited help.  Extending income-tax relief to 
employer contributions to mortgage payments would have more impact but goes against 
general tax principles. 
 
27. Employers clearly have a potential role as partners in Policy 1, in providing land, 
developing shared-equity schemes and facilitating the implementation of other fiscal 
instruments.  Whether employers become involved depends partly on whether they perceive 
particular relative advantages to providing housing assistance rather than increased pay. 
 
28. Providing a flatter playing field between residential and non-residential sites in terms of the 
requirement to provide affordable housing, as envisaged in the Green Paper, could increase 
the number of sites coming forward for residential and particularly affordable housing use.  
However, the policy would have to be combined with fiscal incentives such as Policy 1 to 
generate large-scale changes. 
 
29. Reducing the VAT rate on renovation to 5% (the minimum permissible under EU 
regulations) would reduce the cost of providing affordable housing through renovation.  
Restricting the tax reduction to RSLs would concentrate the policy on affordable housing 
and make it easier to monitor. 
 
 5
30. There are a number of non-fiscal modifications which could make the system work very 
much better.  They include in particular (i) clarifying the definition of best consideration so 
it includes allocating land for affordable housing at sub-market prices and (ii) developing 
standard contracts and transparent frameworks for shared-equity arrangements so that both 
employers and employees can better evaluate the schemes.  There could be large benefits 
from increasing the scale of shared-equity schemes to provide incentives for institutional 
investors to become involved, but these are a long way off. 
 
31. Overall there is a strong case for experimenting with Policy 1 and for developing a more 
coherent approach to demand assistance as defined in Policy 2.  The other policies can act 
in support of these two more fundamental changes. 
 
32. None of these policies will effectively address the same needs as SHG, which is 
concentrated on lower-income households with longer-term needs, and provides higher 
subsidies and greater targeting.  Instead they can supplement that provision by bringing in 
different players, greater choice and a more market-oriented approach.  They will however 
generate significant deadweight losses from transactions costs and inadequate targeting. 
They work best if their use can be directly combined with expansion of land supply. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
Terms of reference 
 
The Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) together with the 
Government Office for London (GOL) and Affordable Housing Unit asked the Cambridge Centre 
for Housing and Planning Research to undertake a scoping study into the potential for using fiscal 
instruments to help tackle the problem of affordability in the housing market. 
 
The specific objectives included: 
 
(a) to identify what fiscal instruments might be available to increase the supply of affordable 
housing; 
(b) to identify what fiscal instruments might be available to tackle the problem of affordable 
housing through routes other than supply; 
(c) to evaluate how such instruments might be applied successfully in the UK and to analyse 
their likely impact; 
(d) to recommend a short list of the most promising instruments; and 
(e) to compare value for money between the short listed instruments and grant- or loan-based 
mechanisms for increasing affordable housing. 
 
Methodology 
 
The project was divided into two stages:  
 
• a review of the full range of possibilities leading to a proposed short list; and 
 
• a more detailed analysis of the nature of the short-listed instruments, evidence of their 
effectiveness and their likely impact on the provision of affordable housing in the UK. 
 
The first stage of the research involved desk research to collect information on fiscal incentives for 
affordable housing in other countries.  Relevant books and journals were consulted, a web search 
conducted, questionnaires sent to housing-finance experts from Germany, Australia, France, 
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, and the US, and discussions held with other 
academics in the UK.  
 
Having collected information about these international fiscal instruments, we categorised the 
policies according to whether they affected supply or demand, and whether they were subsidies or 
worked through the tax system. From this analysis we identified a range of policies with some 
potential in the UK context.  After discussion with DTLR and GOL, a shortlist was drawn up of six 
policies – two concentrating on demand and four where the likely impact was directly on supply. 
 
In the second stage of the research we carried out a more detailed analysis of these six policies 
focusing on the stylised facts about the suggested instruments; their economic rationale; 
appropriate targeting; international experience in implementation; and the practical issues that 
would arise in their introduction.  This analysis led to an assessment of whether and how they 
might be applied in the UK and the likely value for money in introducing such measures. 
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Framework for assessment 
 
The objectives of fiscal incentives include (i) to change consumer income and therefore the 
capacity to pay for affordable housing; (ii) to change the price of affordable housing to consumers 
in order to increase the incentive to purchase or rent adequate accommodation; and (iii) to increase 
the incentive to suppliers to provide affordable housing. 
 
Comparative static analysis has traditionally suggested that income subsidies give higher utility to 
consumers, mainly because of the benefits of choice.  Similarly, price subsidies without constraints 
on choice give higher value than constrained-choice price subsidies – which may operate to 
increase the capacity to purchase other goods and services rather than housing itself.  Therefore in 
well-operating, rapidly adjusting markets the emphasis tends to be on helping low-income 
households directly. 
 
However, where there are additional social benefits to ensuring housing standards, or constraints on 
supply adjustment or distributional objectives, it will often be more appropriate to concentrate 
assistance on supply and prices.  In particular, where the price elasticity of demand for a basic 
necessity is limited above a certain quality, price subsidies to help people achieve a minimum of 
quality will meet both distributional and efficiency aims as compared to income subsidies (Bos, 
1991).  These attributes are usually thought to apply to minimum standards of affordable housing. 
 
The question as to whether price subsidies should be directed at demand or supply has been a 
matter of much academic and policy discussion.  In principle in well operating markets the 
question is irrelevant - as Figure 1 shows, both the impact on output and on the price paid by the 
consumer will be the same.  However reality is likely to be different because of the transactions 
and adjustment costs involved as well as because of the relevant institutional framework. In the 
United States the presumption in the literature is heavily in favour of demand-side subsidies for 
efficiency reasons (Housing Studies special issue, 2002).  Galster, for instance, who is well aware 
of the arguments, suggests that “Problem definition, goal weighting, and metropolitan, housing 
market, socio-economic and governmental characteristics collectively must be considered before an 
unambiguously ‘best’ housing strategy can be identified” but then concludes “The demand-side 
approach, however, can claim a wider range of goals over which it demonstrates comparative 
advantage” (Galster, 1997).   The reason for this conclusion is that housing markets should be seen 
as a series of sub-markets.  Demand-side subsidies allow people to be mobile upwards into higher-
quality sub-markets and supply and price will then adjust to that shift in demand.  Yates and 
Whitehead (1998) responded by suggesting that, at the least, there should be greater agnosticism as 
to their relative effectiveness.  They argued that the US market was not typical of most housing 
markets, especially in Europe.  The particular context in which markets operate, the specific design 
of delivery mechanisms, in particular the role of the social sector, and the potential effects on social 
segregation should all be taken into consideration before coming to a conclusion.  Equally the 
political pressures towards using lower taxes rather than increased public expenditure can be 
important. Even so, it is recognised that there is no guarantee that supply subsidies delivered 
through bureaucratic procedures will necessarily be more effective because administrative failures 
are just as prevalent as market failures (Maclennan and More, 1997).  What therefore is most 
important is not the debate about demand versus supply subsidies per se, but an examination of 
what prevents either from achieving their goals.   
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These conclusions support the approach taken by this project.   They suggest in particular that 
much of the emphasis should be on the effectiveness of the administrative framework, the linkages 
between different instruments, the potential impacts and, especially, relevant price elasticities. 
 
Evidence on price elasticities 
 
The most important price elasticity in terms of the likely outcome of any fiscal instrument is the 
price elasticity of supply  - of affordable housing, housing in general, and land in particular.  If, for 
instance, the price elasticity of supply of housing were to be completely inelastic then the impact of 
either a demand subsidy or a supply subsidy would be wholly to increase price (Figure 2).  Any 
impact would then be limited to redistribution between affordable housing, where the subsidy was 
concentrated (reducing the relative price faced by consumers and suppliers in this submarket), and 
the unsubsidised sector where prices would increase. 
If, which is somewhat more realistic, it is the price elasticity of the supply of land which is 
completely inelastic it may be possible to obtain some additional housing through the impact on 
increased densities.  However the greatest effect will still be on prices rather than output. The 
evidence on price elasticities of supply of land, and therefore the supply of new housing overall, 
suggests that adjustment in Britain is very slow and that price elasticities are low (Whitehead, 
1999; Malpezzi and Maclennan, 2000;  Bramley 1993;  Monk et al, 1996). Empirical evidence in 
England suggests that they do vary between regions and that, rather surprisingly, elasticities might 
be higher for London than for many other regions (Cheshire and Shepherd, 2000).  What is 
undoubtedly the case is that the land-use planning system plays a major role in determining 
production in its effect both on the amount of land made available and the capacity to vary density 
in response to price increases (Bramley et al, 1995).  The most important pressures to adjust land 
supply and densities may also be as much political as direct responses to price change (Barter and 
Jarvis, 2000).  
 
This evidence suggests in the UK context that policies that can achieve additional land and housing 
are likely to be particularly effective in the addressing the affordable housing problem.  At the 
present time, while affordable housing is a material consideration, its provision will not generally 
directly affect overall land supply.   Two mechanisms that aim to modify overall supply are rural 
exceptions sites and their equivalent in urban areas (as operated in Hammersmith and Fulham), and 
greater preparedness at the local level to agree to proposals providing appropriate S106 affordable 
housing proposals (of which there is some, very limited, anecdotal evidence (Crook et al, 2002)). 
 
It is suggested that the supply of accommodation from within the housing stock may be rather more 
price elastic, and that an increase in price may elicit responses, such as bringing dwellings back 
into use, conversions to smaller units and the transfer from commercial and other uses to housing. 
However the empirical evidence on this is limited and there are obvious problems in relation to 
standards and the location and appropriateness of vacant units (Kleinman et al, 1999).   
 
The extent of substitution between affordable and market housing – i.e., the extent to which market 
housing is crowded out as a result of any increase in the provision of affordable housing-- is 
equally unclear, although there is undoubtedly some such substitution.  In the other direction, to the 
extent that affordable housing comes from the existing market sector, assisting one group of 
households put pressures on the other. 
 
On the demand side, the evidence suggests that price elasticities are certainly less than one and may 
be very much less, while income elasticities are probably close to one (Whitehead, 1999).  Thus, if 
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additional income is provided, demand will rise roughly in proportion.  There will be limited 
supply response.  To restrict demand in the market sector will require therefore significant price 
adjustment.   Additional complications arise from expectational changes in response to price 
increases in both supply and demand. 
 
The evidence on price elasticities, in particular, suggests that it is important to direct fiscal 
instruments in such a way as to increase responsiveness as much as possible – both in the 
administered and market sectors.  It also suggests that, however well directed, any instrument large 
enough to have a significant effect on affordable housing provision will add to the pressures on 
house prices, particularly in highly constrained areas.   
 
Deadweight losses/additionality 
 
An important  element in any assessment of fiscal measures must be the extent to which the cost to 
the Treasury will directly impact on demand or supply.  If, for instance, a tax benefit is given to 
suppliers to produce more affordable housing, how much of that payment might go to suppliers 
who would anyway have been provided the accommodation (Figure 3)?   Other things being equal, 
the lower the amount of benefit, the higher the proportion that will go on helping dwellings that 
would anyway be provided.  Larger payments will bring forward additional investment, so 
increasing the proportion.  The two most important questions are therefore (i) how well targeted 
can the instrument be (so as to exclude those that would anyway be prepared to supply) and (ii) 
what are the elasticities of the demand or the derived demand and supply in the relevant housing 
market?  In addition, as the instrument will almost certainly be applied to a sub-market, there is a 
question of the extent of output loss in other markets.  These questions are addressed in Annex 2a. 
 
The relevant comparator 
 
The current method of provision of additional affordable housing is through Social Housing Grant 
(SHG), together with contributions from S106.   Social Housing Grant is an up-front subsidy 
(implying that all the direct impact on public expenditure is taken in the first year).  The headline 
grant rate is 68%.  The actual level depends upon the bidding process and how the impact of rent 
restructuring.  All payments must be directly used for additional provision (including large-scale 
rehabilitation and transfers from the market sector).  The deadweight losses are therefore restricted 
to the impact on costs of production – including land costs and any crowding-out effect, e.g. with 
respect to RSL provision of market accommodation as well as the potential loss of demand in other 
sectors.  Except for the RSL substitution effect these are likely to be small.   
 
The depth of subsidy under SHG is very considerable.  However allocation systems ensure that this 
is targeted at low-income households except to the extent that there is little pressure to move on 
when circumstances improve.  The vast majority of the benefits of SHG are tied to renting from 
housing associations.  This may be a desirable option for many households, but some households 
may prefer a smaller amount of cash and greater freedom of choice. 
 
In comparing potential instruments with the existing system it is therefore appropriate to take 
account not just of the depth of subsidy and its impact on affordability but also the extent to which 
the subsidy is effectively targeted, the freedom of choice provided to the consumer and the benefits 
of spreading the public expenditure costs over time. 
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II ARRIVING AT A SHORT LIST OF POLICIES 
 
Introduction 
 
Our approach to developing a possible shortlist of fiscal instruments was:  
 
• first, to determine a typology of possible instruments;  
 
• second, to clarify how the UK currently fits into this typology;  
 
• third, to allocate all the observed policies in other countries to the matrix typology; and  
 
• finally, on the basis of discussion of the appropriateness of different instruments to determine a 
short list for further analysis. 
 
 
The typology  
 
The following matrix sets out the possible types of government intervention, in the form of 
subsidies or tax relief, to encourage affordable housing.   
 
More general fiscal measures, such as the lack of tax on imputed rents and exemption from capital 
gains tax, are in no way directed at affordable housing per se and so are excluded from the matrix. 
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13 
 
 Tax Subsidy Regulation 
Demand Category 1 
1) Mortgage interest tax deductible  
2) Owner-occupiers can claim depreciation 
3) Preferential tax treatment of home-savings plans 
4) Rent payments tax deductible 
5) Tax credits for low-income tenants 
6) Exemption from transfer tax for first-time buyers 
7) Tax relief for employee on employer-run house savings schemes, 
to equate with treatment of pension contributions 
8) Property tax relief for low-income households 
9) Exemption from transfer tax for new homes 
 
Category 2 
1) Housing allowance  
2) Subsidies to savings for house purchase 
(interest subsidies or one-off grants on house 
purchase) 
3) Subsidised mortgages for low-income 
households 
4) Grants and other assistance to first-time buyers 
5) Grants for low-income buyers (not tied to 
savings) 
6) Right-to buy and other discounts for council 
tenants 
7) Improvement grants for low-income owners 
Category 3 
1) Government assigns 
housing to low-income 
households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supply Category 4 
Income tax 
1) Providers of social housing exempt from income tax 
2) Tax relief on investment in construction of affordable housing for 
rent or sale, to be set against income from all sources 
3) Depreciation for rental units 
4) Landlords can deduct interest on loans and operating expenses 
5) Landlords can set rental losses against other income 
6) Lower tax rate for landlords’ capital gains 
7) Tax relief for interest from mortgage-backed securities used to 
fund low-interest mortgages or low-income housing 
8) Allow capital outlays on construction/conversion of rental property 
to be offset against rental income 
9) Preferential treatment for housing-finance institutions 
10) Preferential tax treatment for employer-provided housing 
Land/property tax 
11) Taxation of empty land to encourage housebuilding 
12) Taxation of empty property to bring back into use 
13) Discount for new/renovated houses, or abatement for specified 
period 
VAT 
14) Reduced rate on conversions, new build 
15) RSLs pay lower VAT 
Category 5 
1) Grants for construction or renovation of affordable 
housing  
2) Subsidised loans for developers of affordable 
housing 
3) Provision of land for affordable housing at below 
market value or free 
4) Grants to bring empty homes back into use with 
allocation attachments 
5) Government guarantees for housing association 
loans 
6) Government guarantees of rent or mortgage 
payments from low-income households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category 6 
1) Require developers to 
include certain % of 
affordable housing  
2) Rent control 
3) Require employers to provide 
housing 
4) Prohibit move of rental flats 
to owner occupation 
 
 

The UK position 
  
Current, and some past, UK policies are classified below according to the preceding matrix.  
Categories omitted are not represented by existing policies in the UK.  
 
Category 1:   UK demand-side tax measures  
 
1.1 Mortgage interest tax deductible 
Owner-occupiers can no longer deduct mortgage interest payments in the UK.  Landlords in 
the private rented sector can deduct interest payments as a business expense. 
 
1.8 Property tax relief for low-income households 
 Low-income households are eligible for council tax benefit. 
 
1.9 Exemption from transfer tax for new homes 
 The government recently announced the abolition of stamp duty for purchases of dwellings 
in certain low-demand areas.  A price ceiling applies. 
 
Category  2:  UK demand-side subsidies 
 
2.1 Housing allowance  
Housing benefit. 
 
2.4 Grants and other assistance to first-time buyers 
Starter Home initiative; cash-limited payments to certain key workers 
 
2.5 Grants for low-income buyers 
Shared ownership and DIYSO:  subsidised rental element of either newly built home or one 
from the existing market sector.  Homebuy: Interest-free loan for a proportion of asset to 
make home ownership affordable. 
 
2.6 Right-to-buy discounts for council tenants 
Council tenants have the right to buy their dwelling at a discount from the market price. 
The size of the discount depends on how long they have lived there and the type of property.  
Tenants incentive schemes provide assistance to transfer to the private sector. 
 
2.7       Improvement grants for low-income owners 
Local authorities give grants to enable low-income owners to carry out certain essential 
repairs. 
 
Category 3:  UK demand-side regulations 
 
3.1 Government assigns housing to low-income households 
 Yes, for social rented housing through RSLs and local authorities. 
 
Category 4: UK supply-side tax relief 
 
Income tax 
 
4.1 Providers of social housing exempt from income tax 
 15
 Yes--as non-profit organisations, housing associations pay no income tax. 
  
4.4 Landlords can deduct interest on loans and operating expenses 
 Yes. Landlords receive unlimited marginal-rate tax relief on interest payments. 
 
4.8 Allow capital outlays on construction/conversion of rental property to be offset against 
rental income 
 Only in the flats-above-shops programme, which ran from 1992 to 1995. 
 
Land/property tax 
 
No reliefs given. 
 
VAT 
 
4.13 Reduced rate on conversions 
 New build is zero-rated.  Renovation work attracts VAT at the full rate, except for certain 
conversion work (changing the number of units in a building), where VAT is applied at a 
reduced rate. 
 
Category 5:  Supply-side subsidies 
 
5.1 Grants for construction or renovation of affordable housing 
Providers of social housing receive Approved Development Programme (ADP) funding for 
construction or acquisition and rehabilitation of rental units and shared ownership 
accommodation.  Local authorities also  provide Social Housing Grant. 
 
5.3 Provision of land for affordable housing at below market value or free 
 Local authorities may provide their own land for social housing.  Traditionally they built 
the housing themselves; more recently they have developed it in partnership with either 
housebuilders or housing associations.  Where a local authority sold land for less than 
market value it would normally expect to receive nomination rights to social housing in 
return. 
 
5.4 Grants to bring empty homes back into use with allocation attachments 
 Yes.  These are local-authority based. 
 
5.6 Government guarantees of rent or mortgage payments from low-income households 
 The possibility exists but it is not used, except in the case of payment of mortgage interest 
for certain unemployed people on income support.  Mortgage Payment Protection 
Insurance is not government guaranteed. 
 
Category 6:  Supply-side regulations 
 
6.1 Require developers to include certain percentage of affordable housing 
 Section 106 can be used to enforce such requirements.  There is a minimum development 
size (smaller in London than elsewhere).  At the moment this is applied only to residential 
development, not commercial except in one or two authorities. 
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 Rural exceptions sites may be identified at the parish level to provide affordable housing 
for local needs.  Public-sector organisations must sell land at the best consideration – this 
may enable them to sell at below market value in order to obtain nominations. 
 
6.2 Rent control 
 Yes, for social housing. 
 
 
Outside above categories 
 
7 Advice to low-income households on homeownership 
 Some. 
 
Summary 
 
In the UK owner-occupation is now effectively treated as a consumption good.  It is therefore tax-
free except for stamp duty and the price-related part of council tax, while the costs of owner-
occupation are taxed.  For private rented housing, on the other hand, the landlord is subject to 
income tax (with cost deductions, but no depreciation) and to capital gains tax – housing is thus 
treated as an investment good. 
 
Other interventions – especially housing benefit – lower the cost of renting to low-income 
households, but there is nothing to provide regular assistance for low-income owners.  There is a 
patchwork of other policies, including right-to-buy discounts, Homebuy, the Starter Homes 
Initiative, and improvement grants, but with the exception of right-to-buy these have a limited 
effect. 
 
In general there is much less subsidy now than a few years ago.  The main remaining subsidies are 
concentrated at the bottom end of the market, mainly through housing benefit.  There are very few 
mechanisms outside Social Housing Grant directly to assist additional provision. 
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Policies in other countries 
 
Policies in other countries are summarised in the matrix on the following page.  Details of the 
policies followed by other countries can be found in Annex 1.   Details of those schemes relevant to 
the chosen short list of policies are set out in Section III.   Note:  the table is not a complete 
summary of affordable housing policies of these countries; it is indicative only.  
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International affordable housing policies (followed now or recently) 
Cate-
gory 
Policy description UK USA F SP N DK B IT IR G FI AU SW CA 
1.1 Mortgage interest tax deductible • • •  • • •  •      
1.2 Owner-occupiers can claim depreciation          •     
1.3 Preferential tax treatment of home-savings plans   •       •    • 
1.4 Rent payments tax deductible        • •      
1.5 Tax credits for low-income tenants  •             
1.6 Exemption from transfer tax for first-time buyers               
1.7 Tax relief for employee on employer-run house saving schemes               
1.8 Property tax relief for low-income households •    •          
1.9 Exemption from transfer tax for new homes •        •      
2.1 Housing allowance • • • • • • •  • • • • • • 
2.2 Subsidies to savings for house purchase    •      • •    
2.3 Subsidised mortgages for low-income households   • • •         • 
2.4 Grants to first-time buyers •   •      •     
2.5 Grants for low-income buyers • •             
2.6 Right-to-buy discounts for council tenants •              
2.7  Improvement grants for low-income owners •              
4.1 Providers of social housing exempt from income tax •    • •    •     
4.2 Tax relief on investment in construction of affordable housing  •        •     
4.3 Depreciation for rental units  •        •  •  • 
4.4 Landlords can deduct interest on loans and operating expenses • •        •    • 
4.5 Landlords can set rental losses against other income  •        • •   • 
4.6 Lower tax rate for landlords’ capital gains  •             
4.7 Tax relief for interest from mortgage-backed securities for housing  •             
4.8 Landlords can set capital outlays against rental income •       • •      
4.9 Preferential tax treatment for housing-finance institutions          •     
4.10 Preferential tax treatment for employer-provided housing               
4.11 Taxation of empty land to encourage housebuilding               
4.12 Taxation of empty property to bring back into use               
4.13 Property-tax discount for new/renovated houses, or abatement •  •          •  
4.14 Reduced rate of VAT on conversions, new build    •           
4.15 RSLs pay lower VAT   •            
5.1 Grants for construction or renovation of affordable housing •  • •      •   •  
5.2 Subsidised loans for developers of affordable housing  • • •      • •  • • 
5.3 Land provided for affordable housing at below market value/free •   •    •       
5.4 Grants to refurbish empty homes w/ allocation attachments •              
5.5 Government guarantees housing association loans      •         
5.6 Government guarantees rent/mortgage payment of low-income households • • •       •     
F = France  SP = Spain  N = Netherlands  DK = Denmark  B = Belgium  IT = Italy  IR = Ireland  G = Germany  FI = Finland  AU = Australia  SW = Sweden  CA = Canada 
 
The preliminary short list 
 
The most immediate finding from our preliminary research was that the UK 
framework is currently unusually simple – concentrating most supply assistance 
through Social Housing Grant and thus the allocation of affordable housing to those in 
need at the time of allocation.  In addition, Section 106 agreements and rural 
exceptions policies act through regulation to assist provision.  Housing benefit makes 
housing affordable for eligible tenants.  There are a number of specific schemes 
especially to help particular groups become owner-occupiers, but very few that 
operate through the tax system. 
 
Across countries there are a wide range of both demand-side and supply-side 
instruments.  These have been applied both quite generally to increase production and 
concentrated on affordable housing or particular groups.  Almost every element of our 
typology can be found somewhere in the countries that we examined. 
 
More generally, some countries have emphasised tax reliefs, while others concentrate 
on grants – the choice relating to their general fiscal ideology and the problems which 
they addressed.  Often the policies look more as if they just grew in response to 
particular political pressures rather than representing a coherent approach to ensuring 
adequate affordable housing.  In most countries the move has been towards less 
general assistance and increasing concentration on particular low-income groups and 
localities.  Evaluation of these policies will depend in part on a reasonable 
understanding of the overall tax systems and housing markets in the relevant 
countries. 
 
The proposed list 
 
Our analysis of both what has been tried and the gaps that seem to remain suggested a 
set of instruments which might have added value in the UK context. 
 
These included: 
 
1. Tax incentives for construction of affordable housing.  These have the 
potential to involve the private developer and to give incentives for new 
investors.  They could also involve employers in a fairly direct manner. 
 
2. An instrument which integrates Homebuy and the Starter Homes Initiative, 
structured to bring in a wider range of lower income workers and probably 
geographically targeted. 
 
3. Savings schemes for first-time buyers, which could include an employer 
element – including, for instance, allowing reliefs equivalent to pensions for 
mortgage savings.  Schemes of this type, while they have fallen out of general 
use, have been reintroduced to help particular groups in a number of countries. 
 
4. Subsidised loans from employers – which would reintroduce an old 
established policy and make it tax efficient for employers to play a direct role 
in assisting their workers. 
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5. Extending section 106 agreements to non-residential sites – which have both 
the potential for providing additional land for housing and may generate the 
need for more affordable housing. 
 
6. Reducing the rate of VAT for renovation work carried out by Registered 
Social Landlords. 
 
A number of smaller schemes were seen as having some potential merit, including; 
 
• grants to bring empty property back into use with an incentive or 
requirement to lease these to nominated tenants; 
 
• improved tax treatment for small landlords – including widening the tax 
exemption for lodger income. 
 
• schemes to support low-income owner occupiers in high-risk properties 
where there is concern about the neighbourhood. 
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 III THE SHORT LIST: DETAILED ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 
Each of the six policies was  examined in detail in order to cover: 
 
• the definition of the instrument; 
 
• how it is expected to work; 
 
• evidence on international experience; 
 
• suitability to the UK; and  
 
• practicalities. 
 
 
Policy 1: Tax incentives for construction of affordable housing 
 
Definition of instrument 
 
Tax incentives for provision of affordable housing, including new construction, 
provision of flats by conversion, and substantial renovation of residential buildings. 
They could be applied to housing for rent, for outright sale, or provided on shared 
ownership terms. 
 
In the UK there is little experience with tax incentives that offer a pound-for-pound 
reduction in the amount of tax payable, and the terms “tax relief” and “tax credit” are 
sometimes used interchangeably.  In the discussion that follows, pound-for-pound 
reductions in the amount of tax payable will be called “tax credits” (following the 
American usage),  while reductions in the amount of taxable income will be called 
“tax relief.”  Tax credits are more flexible than tax reliefs, because tax credits can be 
designed to have any value, while the value of tax reliefs depends on the investor’s 
marginal rate of tax, and so in practice is limited to 40%.  (This is the top rate of 
income tax for individuals. For companies, the top rate is 30%, but companies with 
profits in the band £300,001- £1,500,000 pay corporation tax at a marginal rate of 
32.5%.)  Both tax credits and tax relief are described on this page. 
 
The heart of the schemes are that tax incentives are given to investors in housing to be 
let at below market rents or sold at below-market prices. The incentives could take 
either of two forms: investors would be permitted to deduct part or all or the amount 
invested from their taxable income from all sources (tax relief); or receive a credit of 
part or all of the amount invested to be set pound-for-pound against their tax bill (tax 
credits). These incentives would be conditional on the dwellings being let at below 
market rents for a specified period, or sold at a sub-market price to a house buyer with 
income below a specified maximum.  They could also be targeted at schemes 
providing housing for key workers.  Any such scheme would be directed towards 
households able to pay more for their housing than housing-association rents, though 
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less than full market rents and house prices. It would not be intended as an alternative 
to Social Housing Grant (SHG). 
 
The tax incentive would reduce the net cost of the housing to the investor and so 
enable a commercial return to be obtained from letting at lower rents (or selling at 
lower prices) than would otherwise be required. In economic terms the tax relief or 
credit would be essentially a subsidy from central government, in the first instance to 
investors but ultimately to tenants and purchasers who are enabled to rent or buy at 
sub-market prices or rents.  
 
Provisions would be required to ensure that as far as possible the dwellings were sold 
or let to households that could not afford full market prices or rents, and for the 
protection of public funds.  There could well be some tension between making the 
scheme attractive to investors and the restrictions that would be required for effective 
targeting. For individuals wishing to participate, funds could be pooled – rather like 
an ISA or the old BES schemes. This could widen the attractiveness to include the 
private investor with a social conscience.  
 
The same effect could be achieved with a straightforward expenditure subsidy from 
central government to developers.  Because the government can borrow more cheaply 
than can a private developer, a direct grant (where 100% of the amount is theoretically 
received by the beneficiary) would normally be more efficient in economic terms than 
a tax relief (see for instance McClure p. 111).  However, there are several advantages 
to working through the tax system.  First, government grants do not normally involve 
investors or end users.  Providing tax incentives to investors brings commercial 
discipline to bear in a way that grants do not.  Second, tax incentives can be a way of 
preventing undesirable grant dependency in certain sectors.  Third, tax incentives are 
often paid only after performance is demonstrated, whereas a significant proportion of 
grant is usually provided up-front.  Fourth, most investors already deal with the Inland 
Revenue, so a tax-based scheme would build on an existing relationship rather than 
requiring additional contact with other government departments. 
 
International experience 
 
The main example of a similar policy internationally is the US Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit (LIHTC), which is now the principal federal subsidy for low-income 
housing.   This programme was introduced in 1986 and has been operating, with some 
modifications, since then. 
 
The essentials of the programme are as follows: 
 
“The intent of the program is to provide enough incentives to ensure that there 
will be an adequate supply of low-income housing by granting tax credits to the 
owners of selected rental housing developed for occupancy by low- or moderate-
income households.  Although the subsidy is provided entirely through the federal 
tax code, it is administered through state government agencies, generally the state 
housing finance agency.  States may allocate these tax credits annually up to a 
total equaling $1.25 per capita. (Note:  This has now been raised to $1.75 per 
capita.) (McClure p. 92) 
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The tax credits are always tradeable instruments, and investors pay between 60% and 
95% of their face value (depending on the type of project and the risk involved).  If 
incentives are not tradeable, it limits involvement in tax-incentivised projects to large 
companies—those that have enough resources to fund projects on their own, and that 
are certain to have enough tax liabilities, for a long enough period, to make use of the 
tax incentives.   This rules out charities and other exempt bodies such as pension 
funds, which do not pay corporation tax.  If the incentives are tradeable, however, 
even small firms or charities can participate in the programme by selling the tax 
incentives to investors for cash.  The US rule of thumb is that a liquid (tradeable) 
instrument is worth about 20% more than an illiquid (nontradeable) one.   
 
The program is discretionary; the subsidy is not given as an entitlement to all 
housing developments occupied by low- or moderate-income rental households.  
Rather, proposed developments are selected by the state administrative agency 
through a competitive process.  Winners must develop their project, either 
through new construction or rehabilitation of an existing property.  When the 
property is occupied, the program begins to grant tax credits against the tax 
liability of the property owners over a 10-year period, provided that the units 
maintain restricted-income occupancy for at least 15 years. (…) 
 
The development’s owners may claim credits only against units occupied by 
income-eligible households  No credits may be claimed unless either of the 
following conditions is met:  
 
1. At least 20 percent of the units are occupied by households whose income is 
less than 50% of the metropolitan area’s median family income, or 
 
2. At least 40 percent of the units are occupied by households whose income is 
less than 60 percent of the metropolitan area’s median family income. 
 
The developer must choose to meet one of these two standards before the housing 
begins operation. (McClure pp. 92-94) 
 
The programme has been characterised by continuous beneficial evolution, some of it 
reflected in administrative practice, some codified directly into statute.  For example, 
the original affordability period was 15 years; later it was amended to 15 plus 15 (the 
latter based on a formula price), and most recently to 30 years (with many states 
requiring longer affordability periods, some up to perpetuity). 
 
These income ceilings—50% or even 60% of median family income—are low.   In 
1999-2000 median gross income of household head and partner in England was £310 
a week (Housing Statistics 2001, Table 7.8), so 50% and 60% of the median would be 
£155 and £186 respectively. The figure of £155 a week is close to the median for 
social rented sector tenants; between 60 and 65% of social rented sector tenants had 
incomes of less than 60% of the median for all households.. The American LIHTC 
scheme can therefore be seen as directed at housing for people whose  British 
opposite numbers are provided for by Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) with 
subsidy from Social Housing Grant, not households that can afford more than housing 
association rents but not full market rents and prices. The LIHTC scheme in the US is 
nevertheless of interest as a scheme with a substantial amount of operating 
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experience, and evidence about its efficiency in economic terms. Further details of the 
mechanics are in Annex 2c. 
 
What does US experience suggest about the effectiveness of LIHTC? 
 
US experience suggests that this is an effective programme for increasing provision of 
affordable housing.  It is estimated that the programme has so far aided the 
construction of more than 1 million affordable-housing units.  This compares to a total 
US stock of public (local authority) housing of 1.2 million units.  It should be noted 
that in the US there has been no addition of public housing) in the last 20 years--rather 
there has been a net loss. 
 
While the programme is effective, US analysts point out that it is not particularly 
efficient in economic terms.  “If the federal government grants tax credits of $1000 
($100/year for 10 year) then the present value of these credits to the government is 
about $780, discounting at the government’s long-term cost of borrowing.  When 
evaluating tax credits as an investment, however, investors employ an even greater 
discount rate, found here to be about 11%.  This means that the $780 of housing 
subsidy from the government will produce only $590 in housing.  Clearly this is a 
significant loss of value (about 24 percent) from the use of tax credits as the vehicle to 
deliver the housing subsidy.”  (McClure pp. 110-111) 
 
The process can be represented as follows: 
 
 Government allocates $100 tax credits p.a. for 10 years $1000 nominal
 Discounted at government rate--present value of say     780  
 Discounted at investors’ rate—present value of say      590  
 Less administration fees, syndicator profits (total 11%) 
results in sum to developer of       $530 cash 
 
The relevant fraction is thus $530/780, or 30%.  Over time this discount has narrowed 
substantially, as investors have learned about the process and competition for credits 
has driven prices up.  As the programme has matured, spreads against like-term safe 
rates have compressed to less than 150 basis points (e.g. if Treasury rates are 7.0%, 
investors expect 8.5% or less).  Additionally, credit allocators have used the LIHTC to 
create much deeper affordability than the law requires. As a result, the allocable credit 
per property has remained quite high: the current net present cost to the US Treasury 
per housing unit provided through the credit is estimated to be about $40,000. 
 
British experience with tax reliefs for investment in housing 
 
Two schemes operated in the 1980s and 1990s. The first was the Business Expansion 
Scheme as it applied to assured tenancies.  The scheme operated from 1989-1993 in a 
form similar to the LIHTC, albeit using tax reliefs rather than tax credits, for private 
rented housing.  Syndicators put together packages of BES developments and 
marketed them to investors.  Individual investors got income-tax relief on up to 
£40,000 investment each year in BES firms; if they owned the shares for at least five 
years, capital gains were tax free.  Research (see Crook et al, 1991) indicated that “the 
provision of tax relief was a more important stimulation than the deregulation of rent 
to the setting up of BES assured-tenancy companies” (Crook p. 4) and that “without 
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the incentive of tax relief, directors would not have set up the BES rental housing 
company” (p. 6).  Estimated tax expenditure per dwelling was in the range of £25,000 
to £31,000.  
 
Crook and his colleagues judged the BES policy a success in that it “produced the first 
significant wave of new investment in the privately rented sector since the Second 
World War” (p.35).  In addition,  “the scheme can be regarded as having induced 
investment that was wholly additional” (p.33).   It was structured, however, in a way 
that encouraged short-term rather than long-term investment. 
 
The second relevant scheme was introduced in the 1982 Finance Act and brought to a 
premature end in 1984.  Under this scheme (discussed in Kemp, 1988), capital 
allowances were given to approved landlords providing assured tenancies under the 
1980 Housing Act.  This Act deregulated rents for new-build units let on assured 
tenancies.  Take-up was slow, however, so the government introduced tax allowances 
in the 1982 budget.  “Approved bodies” could deduct 75% of the cost of construction 
of dwellings to be let on assured tenancies from income in the first year, followed by 
4% per annum from the date of first letting for the remaining expenditure.   
 
The scheme did not lead to an enormous amount of new supply (only 609 assured 
tenancies were let in the period 1983-86, according to Kemp), but most of what was 
built was thanks to the capital allowances. Kemp’s survey of approved landlords, 
carried out after the withdrawal of the scheme, showed that 62% had invested because 
of the tax shelters.  Kemp wrote: 
 
Much of the initial interest in the scheme was provided by the capital allowances 
but these were available for only a short period.  The importance of these capital 
allowances, as perceived by the approved bodies, was clearly indicated by the 
survey reported in this chapter.  The figures are quite striking: 87 per cent of 
respondents claimed that the existence of capital allowances influenced their 
decision to apply for approved status under the scheme; 68 per cent of those 
respondents who had not built any assured tenancies stated that this was because of 
the phasing out of the allowances; 81 per cent of all respondents to the survey said 
that this removal had affected their future investment intentions on assured 
tenancies; and 60 per cent cited the reintroduction of capital allowances as a 
change they would like to see made. (pp 93-94). 
 
The reasons why the scheme was withdrawn early related to wider changes in the tax 
system rather than to the success or failure of the scheme.  There was undoubtedly 
some concern in Treasury and elsewhere that introducing depreciation allowances to a 
perpetual asset could cause legal difficulties in the context of company-owned 
property.  There was equally concern that the principle of assured tenancies into 
perpetuity was not turning out to be consistent with government objectives to free up 
the sector. For all this, there a growing feeling at the time that, left in place, the 
approach might be successful in generating private rented output for the first time 
since the war.  
 
Both the BES and the assured tenancy schemes are now dead, but a new urban-
regeneration tax-incentive scheme should begin operating later this year.  This is the 
Community Investment Tax Credit (CITC).  Under this scheme (which is now 
undergoing scrutiny in Brussels to make sure it does not breach state aid regulations), 
investors will receive credits equal to 25% of investment in approved community 
development institutions, spread over five years.  These credits will be claimed 
through the normal self-assessment process.  The aim of the scheme is to encourage 
private investment flows into local businesses by enhancing the return. 
 
When the programme starts to operate, the government will allocate a certain amount 
of tax-credit consents to local agencies (Community Development Funding Initiatives, 
or CDFIs) working in disadvantaged communities (defined either geographically or 
socially).  The total amount to be allocated will not be set in advance, but will depend 
on how many of the CDFI bids meet the government’s standards.  Investors in these 
CDFIs (which can be likened to community development banks) receive tax credits, 
and the CDFIs lend the funds received to approved projects in their areas.  The return 
to the investor consists of the return on the loans made by the CDFI, plus the tax 
credit.  The credit amount is 5% of eligible investment per year for the first five years.  
There is no carry-back, carry-forward, or sale of the credits allowed; they are 
therefore not attractive to nontaxable entities.  There is a five-year holding period 
required.  Investment can be either in the form of debt or equity (unlike the LIHTC, 
where only equity investment qualifies).  It is not yet clear how the eligible 
communities will be defined, or whether tax-credit recipients will be permitted to 
invest in property.  
 
This review of UK practice to date shows that several of the building blocks of the US 
tax-credit system for affordable housing are already within the UK experience, or will 
be when CITC comes into effect.  The following table summarises. 
 
Policy element in the US LIHTC system BES Assured 
tenancy 
CITC 
Credit against tax payable   • 
Incentives received over several years • • • 
Limited allocations  •   
Lock-in period for affordability/investment •  • 
Lock-in period longer than incentive period    
Local allocation of incentives    
Tradeable incentives    
 
How it would work in the UK 
 
There are many possible permutations of the scheme.  One possible version is as 
follows:  Central government would allocate a certain amount of tax incentives for 
affordable housing to administering bodies in each region (possibly DTLR regional 
offices, RDAs, or Housing Corporation offices). We will assume that the incentives 
are in the form of tradeable tax credits. Non-tradeable credits or reliefs could also be 
used although, for reasons given above, they would be sub-optimal.  Companies 
(either for-profit or nonprofit—RSLs would be eligible) would request allocations of 
the tax incentive in order to construct or renovate particular units of affordable 
housing.   
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Once a company received an allocation of credits, it would raise funds from investors; 
the investors would receive the tax credits.  (Allowing the credits to be traded or 
assigned in this way would give the development companies an important tool for 
managing cash flow.  If the companies that receive the tax credits were not permitted 
to transfer them to investors, then only large firms would be able to benefit from the 
programme.)  The credits might be available for equity investment only, or for debt 
and equity.  The proportion of the investment given as a tax credit, and the period of 
years over which the credits should be spread, would be decided in light of the levels 
of rent that were sought and costs.   
 
Construction of dwellings for rent or sale at affordable rents or prices would be 
promoted by organisations that might be called Approved Affordable Housing 
Companies.  For audit and accountability reasons they would have to be self-
contained.  They would raise their funds to finance construction by taking deposits or 
issuing equity shares, which would be eligible for tax relief in consequence of the 
approved status.  The tax relief would be given as a proportion of the amount 
invested, subject to a maximum.  That proportion would be a policy question; the goal 
would be to balance the expected cost reduction against the amount of tax relief that 
could be afforded.  The investor would get his return partly from the interest or 
dividends paid by the company and partly from the tax relief.  The cost of capital to 
the company, and hence the price or rent that it would have to charge to operate 
profitably, would therefore be lower than in the absence of tax relief.  The tax relief 
could be given in several ways—it could be spread over a run of years, or in a lump 
sum.  More details on how it might work are in Annex 2b. 
 
How tax incentives for building affordable housing might work in practice.   
 
The effective cost of construction houses for sale or rent could be reduced to 
affordable levels either by tax reliefs, or by tax credits on the American model.  Tax 
reliefs are familiar in the UK but tradeable tax credits are not.  On the other hand, the 
present marginal tax rate limits the maximum value of a tax relief to 40% of the 
amount invested, whereas tax credits are not constrained in this way.  To use both tax 
reliefs and tax credits in the illustrations would be unwieldy and possibly confusing.  
Tax credits are used so as to introduce the concept to British readers, but that is not to 
suggest that tax credits on the American model are being recommended against more 
conventional tax reliefs, except where more assistance is required than can be given 
by tax reliefs when the marginal tax rate is 40%.   
 
Example 1:  Credit for equity investment, rental housing 
 
This example parallels the American experience.  Assume that a unit of housing costs 
£100,000, and must rent for no more than £450/month to be accessible to low-income 
households.  The investor has a 40% marginal tax rate, and looks for a gross return of 
9% on his investments.  With these figures he would not choose to invest in a low-
income housing development, which would give him a gross return of only 5.4% p.a. 
(£450 x 12)/100,000).  However, a tax credit of 6% of his investment annually over 
ten years would have a present value of  46.13% of the investment cost, discounted at 
6%.  This would reduce the investor’s effective cost to £53,870.  At this level he 
would achieve a return of 10% ((£450 x 12)/53,870), greater than his required return 
of 9%. 
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Example 2:  Credit for debt financing, rental housing 
 
Here we assume a total credit equal to 25% of the amount invested spread over ten 
years, and debt financing.  The credit would be 2.5% annually of the sum invested.   
 
The credit should pass through into a lower cost of capital; the size of the reduction 
depends on the investor’s expected holding period for the new loan amount.  For 
example, if the market interest rate were 6%, and the investor thought the loans would 
be outstanding for ten years or less, a 2.5% annual credit would mean the investor 
would receive an annual combined return of 6% from 3.5% net interest plus 2.5% tax 
credit.  The development company might on that basis raise funds at 3.5% net.  In 
practice, of course, a combined rate of net interest plus tax credit higher than the 
market rate would have to be offered, especially in the early years when the scheme 
was unfamiliar. 
 
If the development company were calculating its rents as housing associations do, 
with a cost of capital at only 60% of the market level (or possibly to start with 65-
70%) the capital-cost element in a rent that covered costs would be much lower than 
with purely market financing.  With a market-level full capital cost of £80,000, the 
capital element in the rent at 6% interest would be £4,800 a year, plus approximately 
£800 for management and maintenance and £400 for contributions to a reserve for 
major repairs, which would give a weekly rent of £115 (or perhaps rather more to 
allow for voids).  For the same dwelling, with the cost of capital 30-35% lower due to 
tax relief, the capital element in the rent would be about £3,120 - £3,360, and the 
weekly rent £83 to £88 a week—that is, 72-77% of the full-cost level.    
 
If rents were, as above, derived from cost figures, a formula would be required that 
linked the rent to the capital cost, the net cost of capital to the company, and adequate 
provision for management and maintenance and contributions to a reserve for major 
repairs.  This would ensure that the dwellings produced by the tax credit were let at 
rents which in effect passed the bulk of the incentive through to tenants.  It would be 
preferable if rents were derived by a formula (based on average area incomes, for 
example, as in the US); in this case, rent is the given and cost is a derived function.  
This approach forces developers to look for ways to reduce costs. 
 
Tax-credit recipients could manage their dwellings themselves if they wished, but 
would be free to sub-contract the job, for instance to a housing association.  The exact 
detail of the rent-setting formula could well be contentious, not only fairly minor 
detail like voids and bad debts but also maintenance and management, and how much 
to allow to be put to reserve.  The goal would be to get value for money from the tax 
credits without making the scheme so rigid that it would be unattractive to investors. 
 
Example 3:  Credit for debt financing, building for sale 
 
The capital would be raised from loans from investors who would be paid a market 
rate net of tax credit, and would receive the credit for ten years (in this example).  
When completed the dwellings would be sold to “eligible” households, who would 
finance their purchases with ordinary mortgages.  The proceeds of the sales would be 
invested, and the interest used to pay the interest due to investors.  Because the 
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company would be receiving interest at market rates, the proceeds of a sale at a price 
below the cost of construction would be sufficient to pay the net rate of interest on a 
sum sufficient to finance the full cost of construction 
 
To illustrate, as in the renting example, the market interest rate is taken to be 6%, with 
tax credits equal to 25% of the amount invested.  The net interest rate would be 3.5%. 
 
(a) The cost per dwelling (site, fees, construction, etc.): £100,000 
(b) The amount raised from investors (per dwelling): £100,000 
(c) The net interest payable annually on £100,000 raised from 
investors (at 3.5 percent net): £3,500 
(d) The capital sum required to pay £3,500 a year, if 
invested at 6%: £58,333 
(e) So with a margin of £10,000 for uncertainty and risk, 
the dwelling could be sold for: £68,333 
 
In explaining how the tax credit could fund more than a 30% reduction in the selling 
price, it is important to emphasise that the amount of the credit is determined by the 
amount invested, not by the rate of interest.  The amount of credit would therefore be 
the same at all rates of interest.  If, for instance the market rate of interest were 4%, 
the net rate of interest (on the same assumptions) would be 1.5%, the net interest 
payable on £100,000 would be £1,500, and the capital sum required to pay £1,500 at 
4% would be £37,500.  With the same margin for uncertainty and risk the dwelling 
could be sold for £47,500.  If, however, the rate of interest were 8%, following the 
calculation through would show the selling price to be £78,750.  The amount of tax 
credit required to produce a given reduction in the selling price relative to cost 
depends on the interest rate. 
 
As with rents, a formula would be required to ensure that enough of the value of the 
tax credit was passed through to the buyer.  This would inevitably be contentious, 
especially how much margin to allow for a margin for uncertainty and risk.  Also 
required would be an official valuation, probably by the district valuer, of the market 
price so that the difference between the market value and the sale price could be 
established.  That would be important for resale restrictions to prevent the household 
that buys at sub-market price from selling the dwelling on the open market and 
pocketing the price difference (see Annex 2b). 
 
Elasticities 
 
The success of such a programme depends on the degree of supply elasticity in the 
housing market—that is, to what extent will housing suppliers increase production of 
affordable housing if their effective cost falls?  To put it another way, by how much 
would the production cost of affordable housing have to fall to induce the new supply 
we want?  The answers may differ by area, and are of particular concern in London.   
 
Evidence from the US experience is positive—the programme has increased the 
amount of market-quality housing available for rent by low-income households.  New 
housing has been supplied in both high- and low-cost areas, and in areas with 
significant barriers to development such as zoning or wetlands-protection 
requirements.  After a slow start, developers now make use of all available tax credits. 
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The results will also depend on the elasticity of demand.  The aim of the programme 
would be to meet some of the unfilled demand for affordable housing in certain parts 
of the country.  But could the programme have the effect of increasing the level of 
demand for new dwellings.  For example, if some percentage of the dwelling units 
produced were designated for, say, primary-school teachers, some might be taken up 
by teachers who were already adequately housed—this is deadweight loss. 
 
Practicalities 
 
• The economic principles behind the scheme are straightforward.  Its operation 
would be more complex.  Rules and enforcement mechanisms would be needed 
to define eligible developers and allowable expenditure; to identify those areas 
and households eligible for housing under the programme; to set allowable rent 
levels or sales prices; to set out how long rental housing must remain 
“affordable”, and provisions for maintaining affordability of owner-occupied 
housing.  These should be established in any enabling legislation and are 
discussed in Annex 2b.  In addition, such a scheme could not operate as an 
entitlement scheme, but would have to be “cash-limited” (though no actual cash 
payments would be involved).  
 
• In a scheme such as this there is an inherent tension between offering sufficient 
incentives to private enterprise to operate the scheme and provide the houses, and 
ensuring value for money by seeing to it that the houses are sold or rented to the 
households for whom they are intended (targeting) and that the selling prices or 
rents are reasonable in relation to costs and the amount of the tax relief.  
Procedures that might appear bureaucratic and off-putting to developers could be 
essential for ensuring value for money from public funds.  How large profit 
margins must be to attract investors is inevitably uncertain. If they were so high 
as to make the scheme poor value for money, then an alternative means of 
involving the private sector in producing affordable housing would be a subsidy 
on the lines of that provided by the Housing Act 1923.  The ‘Chamberlain’ 
subsidy was £6 a year for 20 years or a £75 lump sum, equivalent to £150-£160 a 
year or £1,950 at 2001 prices. The lump sum was equal to about one fifth of 
average cost per new dwelling.   
 
Suitability for the UK 
 
The experience in the USA with the Low Income Housing Tax Credit would not 
necessarily transfer to Britain because the structure of financial markets is different, 
and the government has not yet accepted the principle of tradeable tax credits.  US 
experience does show that tax measures can be used to produce privately funded 
affordable housing, though at a price.  It should be noted that the longer the lock-in 
period for affordability, the greater value for taxpayer money—the BES scheme 
provided for only five years, which was clearly too short.  The minimum for the 
LIHTC in practice is 30 years or more. 
 
Developers would have to be allocated tax credits, possibly by the regional offices of 
the DTLR or by RDAs, before they could seek investments with the benefit of the 
credits.   The Inland Revenue would not therefore have to determine which house-
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building projects qualified as affordable housing. Its role would be to deal with claims 
for tax relief, and check where appropriate that the amounts in respect of which tax 
relief was claimed had in fact been invested. That would be similar to the Inland 
Revenue’s role of Business Expansion Scheme relief and currently the Venture 
Capital Trust relief. 
 
The policy has the flexibility to address particular shortages as well as the broadly 
defined intermediate market.  It could be targeted at dwelling types that are seen as 
being in short supply as well as areas where Social Housing Grant is regarded as 
inappropriate. 
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Policy 2:  Government help for individual purchasers in high- 
cost areas 
 
 
Definition of instrument 
 
An instrument, similar to Homebuy and the Starter Homes Initiative, that would not 
be wholly limited to helping buyers with first purchases, but would concentrate 
assistance in high-price areas.  This might be targeted at particular geographical areas 
or groups of people, including key workers. 
 
How it works 
 
This instrument would allow certain households (selected individually or by category) 
to pay market prices for housing that they could otherwise not afford.  It could be used 
to assist first-time house purchase, but would be designed so that it could also be used 
to help households that needed higher-priced housing—for instance, those moving for 
employment purposes to a part of the country where house prices were higher, or 
moving from a house that was too small or in poor condition. 
 
Recent interest in such schemes stems from the fact that geographical variation in 
house prices is much greater than variation in pay for comparable occupations 
(Holmans, 2001).  The impact appears greatest in public services with national pay 
structures (though eligibility for the programme would not necessarily have to be 
confined to public servants).  Recruitment for these jobs has been increasingly 
difficult in high-house-price areas—notably London and the Home Counties, but also 
other “hot spots” across the south of England. 
 
Payments would be made to selected individual households, not to all that applied and 
qualified--it would not be an “entitlement” programme.  Interested households would 
apply to the agency administering the scheme (probably a housing association or a 
local authority) which would approve the application (or not) according to whether it 
met policy criteria and whether sufficient funds were available. 
 
The assistance could be in the form of a grant (as with the Starter Homes Initiative), 
an equity loan (like Homebuy) or interest-free or low-interest loan (also to be included 
in the Starter Homes Initiative).  Homebuy provides a loan equal to a specified 
proportion of the purchase price (for instance, 25%), interest-free but with an 
obligation to pay, when the dwelling is sold, the same proportion of the price 
received.  Another form of loan would be a non-interest-bearing second mortgage 
loan to be repaid when the dwelling is sold.  An outright grant is a third possibility.   
 
The purpose of the loans or grants would be to make house purchase affordable for 
selected categories of household that could not afford it from their own funds.  First-
time purchasers would be eligible, but so too would households that were already 
owner-occupiers but needed mainly for employment purposes to buy a more 
expensive house.  A move to a high-house-price area would probably be the most 
common reason, but there could be others—for instance, to move from an 
overcrowded or physically substandard dwelling or from an area designated for 
clearance. 
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The schemes discussed would attempt to deal with the disparity between the 
geography of house prices and the geography of pay.  The intervention would take 
place in the housing market, not in the labour market.  The advantages and 
disadvantages of treating geographical differences in pay as given, and compensating 
by selective assistance with housing costs, are not discussed in detail here.  As far as 
the public services go, though, we would note that selective assistance with housing 
costs is far less costly to the public purse than across-the-board increases in public-
service pay in high-house-price areas, and is more flexible in allowing differences in 
house prices between fairly small areas to be recognised and taken into account. 
 
Elasticities 
 
This is a demand-side measure that would have no direct effect on supply.  We can 
assume that such a scheme, by giving certain households more money to spend on 
house purchase, would increase demand for owner-occupied dwellings in certain areas 
(and probably in certain price ranges). Without any increase in supply, one effect 
would be an increase in house prices in those areas—which would enrich existing 
owners, and make affordability more difficult for those households not eligible for the 
programme.  The magnitude of the effect would depend on the price elasticity of 
demand for owner-occupied housing in high-house-price areas, which we assume to 
be considerably less than one.   Small schemes would help targeted groups, but large 
schemes would just shift prices. 
 
In principle it would be possible to link this type of instrument to new private-sector 
developments designated as affordable homes (e.g. under Section 106).  While this 
would be an indirect way of expanding supply it would make the scheme extremely 
inflexible from the point of view of consumers as well as administratively difficult to 
implement. 
 
Practicalities 
 
• Would the amount of assistance be income-related in any way—for example, 
would there be a sliding scale with respect to income, or an income limit? An 
upper income limit would be far simpler to administer although it would have to 
vary by area. Relating the amount of assistance to the purchaser’s income would 
make little sense without relating it to house prices as well.  Making the amount 
of assistance a function of income and house prices would be a step in the 
direction of a version of housing benefit. If the demand for assistance exceeded 
the amount on offer, an upper income limit would be mainly a matter of form. 
The administrative process of selecting the applicants to receive assistance could 
be used to screen out applicants with incomes high enough generally to afford 
market prices unaided.  
 
• How would the amount of assistance be determined?  The possibilities are: i) a 
flat figure, fixed area by area according to the level of house prices there; or ii) an 
amount that varied with the price being paid—either a uniform fraction of the 
house price, subject to a maximum limit; or a flat amount for dwellings within 
each of several house-price bands. These would be set so as to ensure that the 
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difference in the amount of assistance did not fully match the difference between 
the price bands. 
 
• Under what circumstances should all or part of the assistance be “recaptured” if 
the recipient moved to a part of the country where house prices were lower, or 
changed jobs and earned a higher income?  This would apply primarily to grants, 
but “re-cycling” of equity mortgages or interest-free second-mortgage loans 
would make a given budgeted amount go further.  Recapture would be feasible if 
tied to sale of the dwelling. This could be done through a charge on the dwelling 
requiring the grant or loan to be repaid unless a dispensation had been given by 
the agency administering the scheme. The dispensation would be automatic if the 
home owner was moving to another house within the same house-price zone.  
Partial or full repayment would be required according to the level of house prices 
in a different zone. A declaration of income could be required from applicants for 
a dispensation, which could be used for recapture of the assistance if the income 
were above the scheme maximum. 
 
• Should the subsidy be recaptured even if households remain in the same area?  
This is the case for Homebuy, where the risk is shared, as is the equity on resale.  
This policy as part of other equity-sharing mortgage and improvement schemes 
has not proved popular.  Grants will not be recaptured in these circumstances, but 
interest-reduced or -free loans could be linked to evidence of income. 
 
• What criteria would be used for allocating assistance (assuming that the scheme 
were cash limited)?  Should there be an element of employer nomination?  This 
would appear appropriate if the scheme were particularly concentrated on key 
workers or if it were associated with employer involvement (see Policy 4). 
 
• Which agency would administer the scheme?  Local authorities and housing 
associations are the obvious candidates to operate the scheme as agents of (in 
England) DTLR. 
 
• Given that the purpose of the scheme would be to enable people in jobs whose 
pay structures did not fully reflect differences in house prices to buy in places 
where house prices were higher, it would seem reasonable to give preference to 
people in those occupations where local staff shortages were worst.  The 
assistance would probably not, however, be tied to a particular employment 
except at the point of allocation.  To require someone who gave up teaching in 
order to take a different job to repay the assistance would seem impracticable. 
 
International experience 
 
There is much international experience of subsidies for first-time and/or low-income 
buyers.  Many such programmes only apply to new-build housing, and are aimed at 
stimulating the construction industry as well as providing affordable housing.  We 
have found few examples of schemes that are geographically targeted or open only to 
those in certain occupations.  Also, in many countries these are generally entitlement 
programmes, rather than budget-limited. 
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In Hungary, the state gives a grant to assist with down payments or construction costs 
for families.  This can cover up to 45% of construction costs, depending on the 
number of children in the family. (Harsman & Quigley p. 228) 
 
Spain subsidises mortgages for low-income purchasers of new units of “regulated 
housing”, which must met certain criteria and be registered with the government.  The 
amount qualifying for a subsidy depends on the buyer’s income and the size of the 
dwelling.  If the buyer sells in less than five years he must return the subsidy with 
interest; if not, after five years he is re-assessed for continuing subsidy.  There is a 
similar programme for used dwellings (Bartlett & Bramley p. 165 et seq). 
 
In the Netherlands the government offers three types of subsidy, depending on house 
values.  For the cheapest houses, the government pays the principal and interest on a 
part (up to 48,000 florins, depending on the buyer’s income) of the mortgage.  The 
subsidy is treated as taxable income.   For somewhat more expensive houses there is a 
fixed contribution from the government for five years (also taxable, income cap 
applies).  For the third band of houses there is a price cap but no income cap; these 
attract a one-off contribution from the government. (Harsman & Quigley p. 143) 
 
In New Zealand before 1993 the government subsidised loans for low-income wage 
earners.  (Kemp p. 29)  
 
Norway and Finland have both emphasised the benefits of helping particular low-
income groups of first-time buyers.  Finland introduced a subsidised mortgage scheme 
for first-time buyers under the age of 39 in the early 1990s, which included a 5% 
interest subsidy. Norway had a similar scheme seen initially as helping single parents 
in particular (Turner and Whitehead, p56). 
 
In Canada in the mid-1970s the Assisted Home Ownership Programme was designed 
to enable low-income families to buy homes using less than 25% of their income to 
repay principal and interest.  A government corporation provided interest-free loans to 
buyers for five years (Boleat p. 47). 
 
The Spanish region of Catalonia offers grants to buyers under 30 (Bartlett & Bramley 
p. 165 et seq).   Australia gives AUS $7000 to first-time buyers, with an additional 
$7000 for those who buy new homes (reduced to $10,000 total for 2002).  There are 
no income or dwelling-cost restrictions (e-mail from Judy Yates).  Germany offers tax 
credits to first-time buyers, related to their income level and the number of children 
they have. (Balchin p. 60; Ball p. 55) 
 
In New Zealand from 1986 to 1993 the Homestart programme offered grants to bridge 
the gap between the savings of low-income households and the required deposit 
(Kemp p. 29).   
 
Argentina has a scheme which provides a proportion of the equity on a new home, 
together with a proportion of the mortgage.  This is all to be repaid at low interest at 
the end of the original mortgage, and is directed at particular income groups in certain 
parts of Buenos Aires.  Like many of the schemes mentioned above it is seen as a way 
of levering in additional affordable provision (Slemenson, 2000). 
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Suitability for UK 
 
The most important benefit of introducing such schemes in the UK is that the 
principles are already in place in rather more limited schemes. Therefore the majority 
of practical and administrative problems have already been addressed.  There are clear 
concerns about delineation of either areas or categories of households, especially 
given the instability of household formation and the possibility of movement between 
jobs and areas.  These however can be designated and implemented through DTLR. 
 
The broader based the scheme, the more likely it is to include households that would 
anyway have been prepared to pay for their accommodation (thus the greater the 
deadweight loss).  Ideally the instrument should be designed to meet the gap between 
affordability and house prices.  However this will vary between household types and 
other factors such as job stability.  Addressing these targeting concerns too 
specifically would however make the administration that much more complex. 
 
Additional questions relate to the extent to which these schemes can and should be 
linked to shared-equity and shared-ownership programmes.  Logically, assistance 
could be better targeted if these were included.  It would also be easier to include 
some linkages to new development, particularly through RSLs. 
 
It might also make it easier to increase the amount of funding generated by these 
schemes to levels where a secondary market could operate effectively.  However this 
would involve standardising contracts and financing arrangements and should 
undoubtedly be addressed as a separate issue. 
 
The extent of subsidy involved can be varied to address the specifics of the area and 
the stage of the economic cycle.  However the more complex the scheme the less 
likely it is to be taken up either by final consumers or intermediaries/providers.  In 
particular, any uncertainty about whether, when, or how much assistance must be 
repaid, would make this type of scheme unattractive.   
 
The latest evidence (2000/2001) on the average subsidy cost of shared ownership – 
i.e. the ADP cost of building a shared-ownership dwelling – is that it stands at just 
under 27%.  This is the amount which will not be recovered because of staircasing. 
 
The level of subsidy for the Starter Homes Initiative ranges from an interest-free loan 
or grant of £25,000 to £30,000 per household, considerably less than that for shared 
ownership.  That for Homebuy is up to 25% of the equity – but this is expected to be 
repaid.  The value of the subsidy therefore depends on the outcome in terms of capital 
gains.  It would appear unlikely to be effective if the initial funding is less than 20%-
25% of the average value of relevant properties.  The final cost and the popularity of 
the scheme will depend particularly on recapture conditions. 
 
The scheme appears to be an inappropriate means of incentivising supply in the UK, 
which is its role in many other countries.  This is because it aims to address a much 
broader issue of the mismatch between the incomes of certain groups and area-
specific house prices.  A subset of the policy could be linked to specific new-build 
initiatives as with shared ownership and the Starter Home Initiative. 
 
Evidence from Cambridge and elsewhere suggests that, while the SHI is not yet fully 
functional, it has been perceived by both employers and employees as helping 
recruitment and retention (Monk et al, 2002, forthcoming).  However this may be 
more a response to publicity than a longer-term effect.  Evidence on Homebuy 
(Jackson, 2001) is that the levels of subsidy and price constraints are inadequate to 
solve the immediate problems they address.   
 
Overall it is important to clarify the objectives of the scheme and to evaluate the 
social benefits of assisting particular groups into home ownership.  If the scheme aims 
at too many different objectives it will fail. 
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Policy 3:  Savings schemes for first-time buyers 
 
Definition of instrument 
 
Savings schemes for first-time buyers, which might include an employer element—
including for instance allowing reliefs equivalent to pensions for mortgage savings. 
 
How it works 
 
This scheme would provide tax relief or subsidies for savings schemes to build up 
sums for use as a house-purchase deposit.  Regular payments of specified sums into a 
fund would attract tax relief, and interest earned would be exempt from tax.  These tax 
privileges would apply only if all of the fund were used to provide part of a deposit to 
buy a house.  If it were used for other purposes the relief would be withdrawn. 
 
The scheme could be designed to accommodate employer contributions, as with 
money-purchase personal pensions.  Employee contributions to these attract tax relief 
at the contributor’s marginal tax rate.  The employer’s contributions are part of 
employees’ remuneration, and hence are business expenses in the same way as other 
parts of the remuneration of employees.  The investment income of the fund is tax-
free.  A savings scheme for house purchase could be structured in the same way, with 
tax relief for employees’ contributions and employers’ contributions treated as a 
business expense.  It would not be necessary for contributions to come from both 
employer and employee; it would be entirely possible for the contributions to come 
from the employee alone, or from a self-employed person.  Equally it would be 
possible for employers to use it as a means of attracting or retaining key staff. 
 
An element of subsidy could be introduced, if desired, by having a Treasury 
contribution alongside the employer’s and employee’s.  This would be analogous to 
the original financial structure of National Insurance.  The 1911 weekly contributions 
were 4d for employers, 3d for employees and 2d from the Exchequer, hence the 
slogan coined by Lloyd George (Chancellor of the Exchequer and responsible for the 
scheme): “ninepence for fourpence”. 
 
Elasticities 
 
This is a demand-side measure that would have no effect on supply.  We can assume 
that such a scheme, by giving participating households more money to spend on house 
purchase, would increase demand for owner-occupied housing.  If the scheme were 
large this would have the effect of raising prices, benefiting existing owners.  
 
An example of how the scheme might work in practice appears below.  
 
Example:  Contributions from employer and employee only 
 
The employer and employee each contribute £50 per month.  The employee’s 
contribution is net of tax, with tax relief (at 22%) added at the end of the year, as with 
Gift Aid relief for charities.  The fund is invested at 5% gross.  The value of the fund 
at the end of three years would be £4,401. 
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Contributions: £50 per month each from employer and employee 
£3600 total over 3 years 
 
Interest on 5% gross (and net), compounded monthly.  This is equivalent to  
contributions approximately 0.4% per month, so a payment of £100 per month for 36  
months will grow to £3,867.  The amount of interest earned is  
therefore £267. 
 
Tax relief: With relief at 22%, the tax relief per annum on employee contributions  
is equal to 0.282 times the net amount on which relief is given—i.e.,  
£169.20 for net payments of £600 per year.  Total for three years is 
£507.60. 
 
Interest on   The tax relief paid into the fund at the end of the first year remains  
tax relief invested for two years, and at the end of the second year for one year.   
The amounts of interest are therefore £17.30 and £8.50 respectively, 
giving a total of £26.00. 
 
The fund at the end of Year 3 is therefore made up of: 
 
Contributions     £3,600 
Interest on contributions        267 
Tax relief on employee’s contributions      508 
Interest on the employee’s tax relief         26 
 
TOTAL     £4,401 
 
If the fund were not exempt from tax, then interest would be subject to tax at 20%.  
The tax relief on the interest would therefore be £59, and tax relief in total £567. 
 
 
Practicalities: 
 
 How would the use of the fund be limited to paying for house purchase?  A 
declaration might be required, stating details of the property, the lender, and the 
solicitor acting for the purchaser.  This would make it possible to check that a 
house had been bought and that the difference between the purchase price and the 
loan suggested that all of the fund had been used to help finance the purchase.  
Alternatively, the fund could be paid over to the purchaser’s solicitor. 
 
 How could it be limited to first-time buyers?  This is not a concept that is always 
easy to define.  The strictest definition would be that the purchaser (or all 
purchasers if more than one) had never owned a dwelling before.  Less strictly, 
the rule might be that they had not owned a house in the previous five years.  
With registered title, ownership of dwellings leaves a record that can be checked. 
 
 Would there be minimum or maximum savings periods?  Would the scheme be 
contractual?  If so, there could be a penalty element if missed contributions were 
not caught up within a defined period.  Alternatively, there could simply be pro-
rata reductions in tax relief.  There would presumably need to be provision for 
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contributors to withdraw their past contributions in an emergency, forfeiting tax 
reliefs if they did so. 
 
International experience 
 
In Canada during the 1970s any resident non-homeowner could contribute $1000 per 
year, up to a total of $10,000, in a registered home-ownership savings plan.  
Contributions were tax-deductible and the income was not taxed while in the plan.  
No tax was payable if the capital and interest were used to buy an owner-occupied 
house (Boleat p. 47 et seq). 
 
In 1965 France introduced Housing Savings Schemes, under which households could 
save up to FF 100,000 for construction or repair of a house.  Interest was paid tax-
free.  There was no requirement for regular deposits, and after 18 months the saver 
had the right to a loan related to the size of his savings.  In 1969 Housing Savings 
Plans were introduced.  The new regulations required regular annual deposits, and the 
account had to be maintained for a minimum of four years (Boleat p. 64, Ball p. 51).  
France pays an interest premium to savings for homeownership (Ball p. 51). 
 
The German Bausparen, or contract savings and loans system, offers loans on the 
basis of specific house-savings contracts, under which borrowers have to make 
regular deposits in advance until a certain savings target is reached.  Then they 
become eligible for a mortgage.  The government pays 10% of the annual savings 
amount as a subsidy to low-income households. Holders of the accounts whose 
income is too high for subsidy can receive interest tax-free  (Ball p. 13). 
 
Spain gives grants to buyers with housing-savings accounts at the time of house 
purchase (Bartlett & Bramley p. 165 et seq).  In Hungary the state pays a premium on 
top of savings for house purchases (Harsman & Quigley p. 228), as does Denmark 
(Whitehead & Turner p. 230).   
 
From 1995 in Switzerland, people covered by an occupational pension scheme were 
allowed to use part of their accumulated equity to acquire an owner-occupied 
dwelling, pay down existing mortgage debt, or buy shares in a housing co-operative.  
If they were under 50 years old they could use all their equity; if over 50 they could 
use equity to the value of what they had at 50, or one-half  (Balchin p. 34). 
 
 
Suitability for UK 
 
Again this would be more about re-introducing a programme than breaking new 
ground, since historically taxpayers who saved with building societies received 
favourable tax treatment.  This was eroded though deregulation and tax simplification 
during the 1970s and 1980s.   The Bausparen approaches, widespread in Germany 
and other continental countries, have also been eroded by deregulation so that they 
now account for a relatively small proportion of the down payment or mortgage.  
They worked best when it was expected that people would save for some years at low, 
but subsidised, interest rates and benefit from their own and other people’s savings 
when they came to purchase.  This style of approach has become outdated in most 
countries and certainly with the UK framework. 
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The amount of assistance that can be provided is limited by the tax framework.  It can 
have the benefit of allowing employers to provide specific aid to particular groups of 
employees.  The alternative is instead to allow tax-relieved help with mortgage 
payments (equivalent to payments in kind, which used to be untaxed but are now 
taxed at the marginal tax rate).  This would be consistent with wider government 
policies of directing interest-rate relief at partial or first time buyers.  As such it links 
to Policy 2. 
 
The most important objection is that it goes against the goal of simplifying the tax 
system and of ensuring that all payments in kind are treated as income.  On the other 
hand it increases the incentive to save, overcomes a constraint in the system and can 
concentrate assistance on particular groups – notably first-time buyers.  It is for this 
reason that new, highly targeted versions have been under discussion in Scandinavia.   
Equally the approach could be simplified by allowing it to cover all owner groups as 
is the case in most other countries. Clearly the greater the targeting, the lower the 
deadweight loss – which otherwise is likely to be considerable.  The most important 
objection however remains that it is a demand-side subsidy with no direct supply 
implications.  If the incentive is large enough to have a significant impact on demand 
it will also impact on prices. 
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Policy 4:  Fiscal instruments to increase employer involvement 
in housing provision 
 
Definition of instruments 
 
Employers can be involved in provision of housing in at least five different ways: 
 
(i) They can make a contribution to savings schemes, to down payments, to 
mortgage payments or to rent.  This is fundamentally an hypothecated 
salary contribution.  It counts as a cost to the employer and is therefore set 
against corporation tax. 
 
(ii) They can pay moving and relocation costs, which may include short-term 
housing provision or subsidy. 
 
(iii) They can provide land for affordable housing from their own land assets, 
or make a contribution to purchase other land holdings, either to build 
housing that they own and manage themselves or as a contribution to RSLs 
or other providers in return for nomination rights.  Again these might be 
either for rented properties or shared-equity and ownership schemes to 
assist their employees. 
 
(iv) They can build and manage housing on either a rented or shared-equity 
basis for their employees. 
 
(v) They can make a contribution to building and running costs for others to 
provide rented or owned housing. 
 
The first two are means of increasing the employees’ capacity to pay for housing, to 
overcome wealth constraints (in the form of down payments), or to offset removal and 
disruption costs for new employees without increasing their longer-term salary.   The 
other three aim to increase the supply of appropriately affordable housing through 
either a capital or revenue contribution to make it feasible to provide this housing. 
 
All such costs are allowable against corporation tax for profit-making organisations, 
or, if they use their own land, taxable capital gains will not be realised.  Employers 
who see housing assistance as an appropriate means of recruiting or retaining staff 
should therefore already be providing such schemes.  
 
The appropriate fiscal instruments must therefore make it worthwhile to take part.  It 
will be worthwhile if because of these benefits employees will be prepared to take up 
or retain employment more cheaply.  This will occur if employees face a reduced tax 
burden;  if employers gains some direct tax relief;  or if a tax credit is provided to the 
employer.  
 
How they would work 
 
1. Income-tax reliefs on savings schemes and other payments in 
kind/hypothecated cash as described in Policy 3 above.  This makes it 
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worthwhile from the point of view of the employee to accept assistance in this 
form and reduces the cost of employment to the employer.  The employer will 
be able to set all costs against income. Incidence of the benefit, which would 
normally be a maximum of 40% (and more generally the standard rate on 
income tax), will depend on ’negotiation’ between employer and employee. 
Take-up will depend on how much the scheme is hedged around and the 
resultant reduction in benefit to the employer and employees of any such 
constraints. One possibility is to apply the rules for pension contributions to 
housing-related costs for particular groups, or to allow people to use early 
years of their pension contributions on housing – this would entail changes in 
the current law.  Any scheme could in principle apply to either (i) or (ii), 
although schemes which covered relocation costs would have to be very 
closely delineated. 
 
2. Tax incentives for the construction (or major rehabilitation) of affordable 
housing. Here employers would be simply one of the organisations able to 
benefit from the tax-credit approach set out under Policy 1. The incentives 
would enable those with some comparative need or advantage to act in 
partnership with RSLs, probably to provide intermediate market housing. Tax 
incentives would be available for the direct provision of accommodation or for 
contributions to RSLs and others to provide affordable housing in the form of 
shared-equity or rental property. As long as the incentives are tradeable they 
can be of value to non-profit-distributing as well as to profit-making 
organisations. 
 
3. Depreciation allowances, including accelerated depreciation, for employer 
owners (or partners) of affordable housing.  These would be exactly similar to 
the approach taken in 1982 with respect to assured tenancy construction and 
can also be subsumed under Policy 1.  They would not help non-profit 
employers. 
 
4. Relief from capital gains tax on land and residential property sales for 
affordable housing.  This would provide an incentive to employers with 
appropriate land holdings to make land assets available to affordable-housing 
providers rather than simply to develop the land themselves.  This would 
formally be separate from the question of the appropriate level and type of 
S106 contributions should be negotiated and to the purchase of nomination 
rights.  However, in practice, they are likely to be closely linked.  This would 
apply only to profit-making organisations. 
 
5. In the public sector a related approach would be to ensure that the Treasury 
rules include affordable housing within the definition of ‘best consideration’.  
At the moment many public-sector and agency landowners do not see this as a 
possibility for fear that it would be questioned.  Were the position to be made 
clear it would become automatically acceptable for certain employers to sell 
land for the provision of affordable housing in return for nomination rights. 
Thus, for instance, the NHS or educational trusts might make land available to 
RSLs in order to obtain nomination rights for either rented units or shared 
ownership or equity. 
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6. An hypothecated  payroll tax.  This is a rather different approach, which 
provides a fund to enable additional affordable housing to be provided or  
mortgage interest rates to be subsidised.  It has been common in many 
countries aiming to provide a large-scale new-build social programme, but has 
generally been phased out. 
 
International experience  
 
We found no evidence of specifically employer-based schemes for the direct 
provision of affordable housing, except in the context of regulations requiring 
provision as were found in transition economies.  There has been no attempt to 
replace that approach in transition economies by fiscal incentives to employers. 
 
Switzerland does allow housing costs to be treated in the same way as pension 
contributions and so provides an incentive to employees and employers to make 
higher contributions. 
 
The idea of a fund to help provide affordable housing or make mortgages affordable 
has been tried in a number of countries, notably in France and in many South 
American countries.  In France this fund was used to finance provision of Habitations 
a Loyer Modere (HLMs—broadly equivalent to housing associations) and loans for 
home ownership.  It can now also be used to subsidize the demolition of bad HLM 
dwellings.  In Brazil, Argentina, and a range of other countries, the funds were used to 
provide mortgage loans at below-market interest rates.  All such funds have been 
phased out partly as finance markets have been deregulated, partly on competitiveness 
grounds, and partly for distributional reasons.  In particular. subsidised interest rates 
tended to mean that all employees across the income range funded those on higher 
incomes able to afford to purchase their own homes. 
 
Suitability for the UK 
 
The history of employer housing provision in the UK  
 
Large numbers of employers have traditionally provided housing for their employees 
for a range of reasons including: 
 
 they need these employees  to locate near their work – e.g., caretakers, police, 
nurses;  
 they are the main employer in an area (and they can bear the risk of variation in 
demand more effectively) – e.g., company towns, notably for coal mining;   
 employees need housing at a particular stage in their careers – notably student 
professionals;   
 their employees are particularly mobile – teachers, construction workers;  
 they themselves have accommodation as part of their activities – hotel and 
catering, caretakers; or 
 they have altruistic motives – Rowntree, New Earswick, Port Sunlight, 
Bournville. 
 
Equally employers have provided housing-specific elements in remuneration 
packages because they are the cheapest/most acceptable way of recruitment and 
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sometimes retention; the employer can overcome constraints, such as on down 
payments or borrowing costs, more effectively; or because they have a fiscal incentive 
so to do. 
 
Before the 1970s there was large-scale employer involvement in housing and housing 
finance provision.  Some 25- 30% of the private rented stock was held by virtue of 
employment and many employers provided housing-specific assistance. Since that 
time employer involvement has decreased very significantly, in part because fiscal 
incentives have been removed.  In particular the provision of accommodation at below 
market rents or loans at below market interest rates became taxable as income. 
However there were other important changes that reduced the benefits, including: 
 
 deregulation of the finance system – so individuals have been able to borrow for 
themselves; 
 rising aspirations, notably with respect to owner-occupation and freedom of 
choice; 
 a lack of comparative advantage among employers in owning and managing  
housing; 
 government sell-off policies, which have affected the NHS, police and nurses 
housing in particular; and  
 the decline of some of the industries that had traditionally provided housing – 
notably the coal mining industry. 
 
From the employee’s point of view, unhypothecated income is normally more 
desirable than hypothecated money unless their costs are reduced or constraints 
overcome.  This has tended to mean that employer assistance has been concentrated 
on removal packages where costs can be readily identified and negotiations are 
transparent.  They can also be based on individual circumstance and be cost limited.   
 
Equally, employees have generally wanted to be able to separate their housing and 
employment decisions and have not wished to be tied to their job by living in 
employer accommodation.  They also perceive such housing as adversely affecting 
their capacity to get on the housing ladder.   Employer housing has therefore tended to 
concentrate on new entrants and student accommodation--although even here 
aspirations with respect to the quality of accommodation and its location are rising 
rapidly. 
 
The current position in the UK 
 
The evidence from a number of studies in Greater London (GLA, 2000 and 2001), 
Surrey (Monk et al, 2000) and Cambridge (Monk et al, forthcoming) suggest that 
there is considerable appetite among employers in pressure areas to be involved in the 
provision of affordable housing.  
 
In Surrey, for instance, there was at least one example of an employer allowing 
employees to use pension funds for housing purposes.  Others argued that it would be 
a desirable approach. However, without any fiscal incentive this is quite expensive. 
Reliefs equivalent to pension rights would almost certainly result in large-scale take- 
up.  The obvious cost relates to reduced pension rights in the longer term.  On the 
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other hand, it would be a mechanism by which assistance could be provided without 
re-introducing the problem of payments in kind within the general tax system. 
 
The National Health Service has taken the initiative of providing new accommodation 
for those at the beginning of their careers, mostly in the form of cluster 
accommodation.  There is concern even in the NHS about location, longer-run 
viability given aspirations, and the extent to which there are even now vacant units.  
Some of the same concerns apply to the police.  Such initiatives may also tie up 
significant capital unless ownership can be transferred to financial institutions or other 
investors. 
 
A number of employers in London, notably those involved in the Keep London 
Working consortium, have been prepared to make contributions to the provision of 
affordable rented housing in exchange for nomination rights.   
 
There is considerable evidence that some employers would be prepared to take an 
equity stake in shared-equity schemes if they could be certain that these could be 
maintained into perpetuity.  However, this is currently a complex issue, which cannot 
readily be addressed in the context of individual schemes.  If pension funds and other 
institutions are to be prepared to purchase the shared-equity element, then a minimum 
scale must be achieved.  It will require government support to achieve such scale. 
 
More general evidence showed that the majority of individual employers, even for 
instance in education, were not certain that they could effectively manage vacancies -- 
or indeed accommodation.  The preferred approach is therefore to make contributions 
to a group scheme run by RSLs or other organisations and to purchase nomination 
rights, which could then be transferred between employers as required.   
 
Finally, there was a great deal of evidence that public agencies were unclear as to the 
extent of their powers to include nominations to affordable housing as a reasonable 
reason for transferring land at a discount. 
 
In all cases, if the subsidy in submarket rents continue to count as income for tax 
purposes, the numbers of employees wishing to take up the option is likely to be 
limited.  The position with respect to shared equity could be more positive, if more 
complex, in that the employer maintains ownership over a proportion of the asset.   
 
The most important immediate requirements if employers, notably public agencies, 
are to take a larger part in affordable housing provision relate not so much to fiscal 
instruments but to (i) ensuring that nominations for affordable housing are clearly 
included in best consideration and (ii) improving the regulatory framework to assist in 
developing the shared equity market for employees.  
 
The most fundamental limitation from the employees’ point of view is that submarket 
rents and interest rates are counted as income in kind.  This makes them uneconomic 
for employers to provide – even though there is considerable interest in such 
provision. In the context of interest payments, reliefs such as those available for 
pensions can help to address this problem.  Otherwise provision is likely to be limited 
to the types of dwelling where transactions costs can be most effectively reduced, in 
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particular hostel or similar accommodation for new entrants and trainees and those in 
the area for short periods of time. 
 
The limitations for employees in employer-based shared equity include:  implications 
of moving job;  difficulty of realising their own equity given the lack of a secondhand 
market;  incapacity to staircase up in situ; and a general lack of understanding of the 
nature of the contractual arrangements.  Employer-based schemes are likely to be 
most successful when they concentrate on large employers with a particular need to 
house trainees or mobile workers.  Schemes might therefore be concentrated on hostel 
or cluster-style accommodation, as long as they were flexible enough to be transferred 
to other uses were the market to change. 
 
Employer-based schemes also provide an opportunity for developing shared-equity 
approaches more broadly.  However there are many practical issues, including the 
organisation of the resale market and the specification of contracts, which would have 
to be addressed before large-scale take-up could be assured.  Equally, most employers 
do not want to tie up funds in residential assets for long periods of time.  The overall 
scale would have to be large enough to allow the transfer of ownership to pension and 
insurance company funders. 
 
Including employers in the broader policies already discussed depends significantly 
on solving problems not directly related to fiscal incentives, notably the definition of 
best consideration in the public sector and standardisation approaches to shared-equity 
contracts, as well as broader questions about how to develop large enough markets to 
interest institutional funders. 
 
The most obvious approach to enable employer involvement is to count them as 
appropriate providers under Policy 1.  Certain types of employer would clearly find it 
beneficial to act as partners and equity providers to RSLs and developers.  Equally 
these saleable incentives can benefit non- profit organisations as much as those in the 
for-profit sector.   The scheme could be linked to land provision where appropriate – 
although this would raise concerns about the potential for double subsidy. 
 
Assessment 
 
Employers may have rather more incentive than some others to be involved in 
affordable housing provision.  They may also have land which they would be happy to 
develop.  Finally they can be useful in operationalising potentially valuable fiscal 
incentive schemes, since they can be lead partners and would be in a position to 
implement savings and mortgage schemes and to benefit from tax credits.  There are, 
however, few fundamental differences between employer-based schemes and the 
more general schemes discussed under Policies 1, 2 and 3.  The examples and 
assessments above therefore apply. 
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Policy 5:  Encouraging mixed-use and housing-only 
developments on sites previously designated for non-
residential development 
 
Definition of instrument 
 
Extension of S106 to non-residential sites or, following the Green Paper, setting a 
tariff for affordable housing on these sites.  Fiscal incentives to increase the 
profitability of affordable housing and so transfer land from employment uses to 
housing uses. 
 
How would it work 
 
The allocation of land for residential purposes is fundamentally a land use planning 
rather than a fiscal issue.   The decision whether or not to designate land for housing  
or for mixed use is not in principle subject to fiscal incentives.   
 
At the present time s106 for affordable housing applies only to residential 
developments.  The rural exception policy allows the additional designation of land 
which would otherwise not obtain planning permission where local need at the parish 
level can be proven.   Hammersmith and Fulham have extended this exceptions policy 
to urban non-residential sites arguing that, in principle, affordable housing should be 
provided on all sites where any type of development is to be permitted.   This has 
some consistency with the traditional planning approach to planning gain 
negotiations, which required obligations to be related to the permission, since other 
types of development often increase the local requirement for affordable housing. 
 
Evidence with respect to the GLA policy suggests that some affordable housing 
possibilities are now being forgone because of the complexity of the negotiations 
process and perhaps because of the large number of other planning obligations.  The 
GLA Assembly Building is thought to be a good example – affordable housing was 
discussed here but not pursued.   
 
The DTLR Green Paper (DTLR 2001) on planning, which is currently out for 
consultation, suggests the use of a tariff approach which would extend the obligation 
to provide to affordable housing to residential sites below the current threshold and on 
non-residential sites. 
 
Providing mixed-use sites is consistent with the government’s sustainability policy.  
However there are clear problems with respect, in particular, to the payment of service 
charges – which can mean that although rents or mortgage payments are affordable, 
the overall costs to households are not.  There are additional costs of management if 
there is pepper-potting and there may be price and therefore profit reductions on 
market housing.    
 
Transferring land from employment to housing use will only occur if both the owner 
wants to bring the land forward for development and the planning authorities agrees.  
This will only occur if incentives are provided, constraints reduced, or other 
opportunities are further curtailed. 
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International experience 
 
The UK land use planning system is very specific to the United Kingdom – although 
the initial idea of negotiating a proportion of affordable housing owes much to 
schemes that have operated in the United States.  There is evidence of successful 
mixed-use projects in the US and Japan but any fiscal instruments involved are 
fundamentally those that have already been discussed.  In the US much of the benefit 
in redevelopment and renewal projects comes from generating the scale necessary to 
access cheaper wholesale funding.  In the main, including affordable housing 
increases complexity, reduces the financial scale of the project and adversely affects 
viability.  Fiscal incentives such as those discussed under Policy 1 are therefore 
required. 
 
Suitability for the UK 
 
Redesignating land from industrial and other employment uses to housing is wholly a 
land use planning issue.  There is some concern that this process has already gone too 
far in London with respect to large employment sites necessary for particular types of 
industry.  In many other parts of the country there is clearly more land designated for 
industrial and employment use than is likely to be used – and there is planning advice 
to transfer where appropriate.  However many sites are unsuitable because of transport 
and other sustainability problems as well as concerns about contamination.  Fiscal 
instruments to address contamination issues have been discussed in the context of the 
Urban White Paper.  
 
In the context of planning obligations the addition of an affordable housing 
requirement simply increased the ‘betterment tax’ element.  It may make some sites 
unviable or simply substitute for some other infrastructure provision.  It may also 
increase negotiation time and increase delays. 
 
On the other hand it provides more of a flat playing field between designations and 
could mean that housing becomes an option for some sites which would have been 
more profitable without under the existing regime. 
 
One area where it is felt that there might be benefits is in relation to large scale 
renewal projects.  Here a major concern is to bring in funding from global institutions.  
This is proving difficult for two main reasons – the very large up-front costs 
associated with the private provision of infrastructure and planning obligations, and 
the relatively small size of projects in US terms.  Providing fiscal incentives – of the 
type suggested in Policy 1 - would help make affordable housing more profitable, 
would assist the market to fund the capital through the capitalisation of the tax 
incentives, and would increase the potential size of projects, which can, at least in 
principle, reduce the overall costs of funding. 
 
None of these benefits has been analysed in any detail, so it is impossible to estimate 
likely take-up.  However, if the government were to decide to look further at tax 
incentives for construction, the potential for increasing land supply for affordable 
housing through these mechanisms should be taken into account. 
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Policy 6:  VAT reduction for renovation of affordable housing 
 
Definition of instrument  
 
Reduction of VAT on the renovation of affordable housing.  This could be a general 
policy addressed to all renovation or it could be restricted specifically to social 
landlords or by some other criterion. 
 
How it works 
 
Construction of buildings for residential or charitable use is currently zero-rated for 
VAT in the UK.  Renovation work, however, attracts VAT at the full rate of 17.5%, 
except for certain conversion work involving changing the number of units in a 
building, where VAT has been applied at a reduced rate of 5% (the lowest rate 
permitted under EU regulations) since April 2001. 
 
The suggested policy would reduce VAT on renovation of existing buildings for 
affordable housing.  The broadest version of the policy would be to treat all 
renovation in an equivalent manner to new construction.  The fact that new build is 
zero rated reflects the traditional view that such investment is socially valuable.  
However, it is an anomaly in European taxation which can continue only because it is 
already in place.  Bringing renovation into line would be virtually impossible in the 
European context.  It would, however, be permissible to reduce VAT on renovation to 
5%, the minimum allowed.  This would be consistent with policies to increase the 
proportion of brownfield sites.  The net benefits of such a reduction in terms of 
affordable housing, which is provided through both new output and renovation, would 
however be negligible.  
 
The reduced rate of 5% on conversions is already in place, although it is too early to 
assess its impact.  It has the benefit of being reasonably easily monitored (even though 
statistics on conversions are notoriously inadequate).  It introduces a distortion 
between conversion and renovation without changing the number of units.  Applying 
the reduced rate across all renovations would be more coherent. 
 
The distinction between conversion and renovation and other expenditure is fairly 
readily determined.  The distinction between renovation and repair is very much less 
clearly defined, but extending VAT reductions to repairs would make the policy far 
more expensive and far less effectively targeted either at socially desirable investment 
or specifically at affordable housing. 
 
The most direct and easily monitored approach would be to limit reduced-rate VAT to 
RSLs only, although it might be appropriate to include properties leased from the 
private sector for a minimum period – e.g., five years.  Many RSL renovations of 
existing buildings would anyway involve changing the number of units, and therefore 
would already attract reduced VAT under the conversion scheme.  However, this 
scheme certainly does not cover all RSL renovation. The case for limiting reduced-
rate VAT to RSLs lies in (i) ease of monitoring and enforcement;  (ii) targeting 
assistance directly at affordable housing;  (iii) stretching the ADP;  and possibly (iv) 
providing an incentive for private owners to lease to social landlords. 
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Elasticities 
 
The goal of the VAT reduction would be to increase the supply of affordable housing 
through lowering the cost to the suppliers of renovation and bringing dwellings back 
into use.  The magnitude of the effect would depend on the elasticity of supply with 
respect to cost.  The cost reduction would be a fairly small one (a maximum of 12%, 
compared to the current headline rate of Social Housing Grant of 68%), so any supply 
response would likely be small as well.  There would also be some losses from 
increased prices. 
 
International experience 
 
France, Belgium, Italy and Spain have preferential rates of VAT (not zero) for 
construction of “social” housing.   Ireland and Luxembourg have a preferential rate 
for all house building.  
 
In France since 1996 HLM organisations (like RSLs) have paid a reduced VAT rate 
on construction and major repairs.  This is now 5.5% (compared to the standard rate 
of 20.6%).  This lower rate of VAT replaced a 12.7% grant for new HLM buildings; 
the reduction in VAT has roughly the same effect on HLM costs as the grant did.   
 
In Belgium the normal rate of VAT is 21%.  For new dwellings for social landlords, 
as well as new dwellings for private owners below a maximum size limit (190 m2 
floor area for houses; 100 m2 for flats), the rate is 12%.  For renovation of dwellings 
over 20 years old the rate is 6%.  In Italy the general rate of VAT is 20%, but for 
subsidised new building the rate is 4%, according to Donner.  The scope of 
“subsidised” new building is not clearly stated. In Spain the general VAT rate is 17%.  
There is a 7% rate for new housing generally, and 4% for “social” dwellings.     
 
It is not clear how up to date this information is.  The 4% rates given for Italy and 
Spain are below the 5.5% rate that is often quoted as the minimum reduced rate 
permitted by EU rules, but almost certainly predate European harmonisation.   
 
We have not uncovered any research into the effects of these policies, which seem to 
be based more on principle and tradition than on cost effectiveness. 
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Suitability for UK 
 
Bringing VAT for renovation into line with VAT for new building makes sense as a 
general policy in terms of appropriate incentives.  Given the European context, it is 
unlikely that any such harmonisation can occur below a minimum of 5%.  This makes 
it less attractive from the point of view of maximising affordable housing investment. 
 
Reducing VAT on renovations to 5% without imposing a positive VAT rate on new 
building would be more cost effective from the point of view of affordable housing 
providers. 
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IV SCOPING ASSESSMENT OF POLICIES 
 
Introduction 
 
The assessment is based on the set of tables that follows.  They draw together the 
main attributes of the schemes and allow some comparisons and early overall 
evaluation.  It should be noted that in our assessment we are assuming that these 
policies would be introduced in addition to SHG and S106 and would mainly be 
aimed at the intermediate market (both rental and different forms of owner-
occupation), where households require some subsidy but not at the levels that obtain 
in the traditional social rented sector. 
 54
Policy 1: Tax incentives for construction of affordable housing 
 
 In principle Evidence 
Coverage/can it be 
targeted? 
Selected newly constructed or 
substantially renovated 
affordable housing.  Can be 
targeted by area, dwelling 
type or occupant group. 
US: Each state receives 
annual amount of tax relief 
in proportion to population, 
to allocate according to state 
priorities 
Formal incidence Developer, employer or other 
actor 
Actually will partly go to 
intermediaries and 
transactions costs – plus 
problems of cost control 
particularly with respect to 
land.  Works best if 
additional land can be 
identified? 
Depth of subsidy Depends on structure of tax 
relief 
In US:  10% of eligible costs 
p.a. for 10 years—net 
present value 70% (at 
government’s discount rate) 
or 58% (at investors’) 
Likely market 
response 
Increased construction of 
affordable dwellings; possible 
higher land price 
In US: Responsible for 
600,000 to 900,000 units of 
new affordable housing in 
first 10 years—high % of 
total.  In UK, 1982-4 capital 
allowances for assured 
tenancies were responsible 
for large % of (negligible) 
total output 
Percent of initial 
subsidy directed at 
affordable housing 
Present value of stream of tax 
benefits, less administration 
costs and syndicators’ fees 
Originally as low as 50%; 
today about 75-80%.  Steady 
improvements in efficiency. 
Comparison with 
Social Housing 
Grant 
Can achieve as deep a 
subsidy—but significantly 
higher transactions costs 
If limited to tax relief, 
maximum help would be 
marginal tax rate; for credits 
could be higher.  Trans-
actions costs likely to be 
between 15% and 25%, on 
evidence of BES and USA. 
Appropriateness for 
particular groups 
Could help increase supply 
for particular groups such as 
cluster accommodation for 
trainees or relevant properties 
Could provide an instrument 
to address “intermediate 
market” gap and help RSLs 
widen their range 
Practical issues Tax relief given on loans or 
equity, or both? 
How is eligibility 
determined? 
Who qualifies to live in 
In US: On equity only 
 
Through competition for 
limited funds 
Household income limit 
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housing so constructed? 
How are funds administered? 
applies 
By state housing authority 
Overall evaluation Worth following up 
especially as consistent with 
the Treasury’s current 
position..  Addresses the 
major gap in affordable 
housing policy—helping the 
low waged employees, while 
helping to meet their 
aspirations. 
It has worked effectively 
though not efficiently in a 
very different environment  
The transactions costs and 
deadweight losses must be 
weighed against the 
development of markets and 
choice. 
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Policy 2: Government help with purchases in high-priced areas
   
 In principle Evidence 
Coverage/can it be 
targeted? 
Yes.  Selected purchasers in 
high-house-price areas and/or 
in certain occupations.  
Internationally these 
programmes are generally 
not limited by location or 
job; eligibility determined by 
income levels, age, family 
size.  Normally entitlement. 
However this is mainly 
because aimed at increasing 
supply through expanding 
demand. 
Formal incidence Households Some loss through higher 
prices and costs of operation 
Depth of subsidy Depends on structure – must 
be adequate to generate 
affordability for relevant 
groups.  Others low interest 
or interest free.  The evidence 
of Homebuy suggests 25% 
zero interest with equity share 
inadequate. 
Some (Australia) flat figure; 
some (Hungary) up to 45% 
of dwelling construction cost 
Likely market 
response 
Increase demand for/price of 
homes in certain areas and 
price bands 
No evaluation found 
Percent of initial 
subsidy directed at 
affordable housing 
All, but significant  number 
may have been prepared to 
purchase anyway – given 
different attitudes to risk and 
commitment as well as 
repayment profile. 
Evidence on shared 
ownership is that it brought 
in a different, more risk-
averse group rather than  
increasing preparedness to 
pay.  Evidence of earlier 
schemes involving equity -
based loans is that they are 
not seen as particularly 
desirable unless 
Comparison with 
Social Housing 
Grant 
Aimed at a different group--
those who aspire to home 
ownership but can’t afford it, 
and where there is social 
value in meeting their 
expectations in given 
locations 
 
Appropriateness for 
particular groups 
Can be highly targeted by 
area and group 
 
Practical issues Criteria for eligibility?  
Income related?  Employer 
nomination? 
Amount of assistance—flat 
Usually related to income or 
family size 
 
Examples of flat figure and 
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figure, % of purchase price, 
or set by price band? 
 
Recapture of funds if 
household circumstances 
change? 
Who administers? 
% are found.  Amount of 
assistance often related to 
household income 
Spain: on sale of dwelling 
within 5 years 
 
Normally central or state 
government 
Overall evaluation Worthwhile in part because it 
synthesises existing schemes 
and makes them more 
consistent.  Help directed at 
relevant areas – but concern 
about impact on prices.  
Should it simply synthesise 
and expand Homebuy and the 
SHI, or embrace shared 
ownership and DIYSO as 
well? 
To be effective will impact 
on prices in pressure areas.  
Limited evidence from 
Cambridge and elsewhere 
that SHI has helped attitudes 
to recruitment and 
retention—even though not 
yet in operation.  The more 
targets and means of 
achieving them that the 
government tries to include, 
the more complex the 
scheme.  If a tax credit were 
introduced it would be 
important not to double 
subsidise. 
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Policy 3: Savings schemes for first-time buyers 
 
 
 In principle Evidence 
Coverage/can it be 
targeted? 
Yes.  Savers who have 
never/not recently been 
homeowners.  
Internationally, not always 
limited to non-homeowners 
Formal incidence The saver or saving employee Will be some losses in terms 
of  substitution  
Depth of subsidy Depends on structure, but 
probably limited to marginal 
tax rate. 
Interest usually tax-free; 
some countries pay 
additional subsidy to low-
income savers.   
Likely market 
response 
Demand-side stimulus; 
effective probable result 
higher house prices 
No evaluation found 
Percent of initial 
subsidy directed at 
affordable housing 
Difficult to target effectively 
using traditional approaches. 
Might be easier via pension 
style of approach  
 
Comparison with 
Social Housing 
Grant 
Would be a far lower level of 
subsidy directed at those 
higher up income scale. 
Used to overcome deposit 
constraint.  Possibility of 
linking to mortgage-interest 
subsidies—see Policy 2. 
Appropriateness for 
particular groups 
Can be targeted especially 
vis-à-vis employers 
 
Practical issues How to limit use to house 
purchase? 
 
How to limit to first-time 
buyers? 
 
Minimum/maximum savings 
period? 
Is the scheme contractual? 
All such schemes are so 
limited; no details of exact 
mechanisms 
Only Canada in 1970s had 
such a limit; others open to 
all 
France: minimum 4 years 
 
Germany: yes 
Overall evaluation Worth thinking about again – 
but does depend on 
Treasury’s attitude to 
simplification of tax system 
and income in kind. Could 
work well with employer 
involvement.  Large 
deadweight loss if scheme is 
universal. 
Level of assistance relatively 
small.  Perhaps better to 
concentrate on versions of 
Policy 2. 
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Policy 4:  Fiscal instruments to increase employer involvement 
in housing provision 
 
 
 In principle Evidence 
Coverage/can it be 
targeted? 
As Policies 1, 2 and 3.  Can 
target certain classes of 
employers—e.g. public sector 
Very little on employer 
fiscal incentives of any type 
Formal incidence As Policies1, 2 and 3 As Policies 1, 2, 3 
Depth of subsidy Depends on detail but 
addressed to intermediate, 
low-income employed market 
 
Likely market 
response 
Employers likely to be 
prepared to take up 
instrument where they have 
additional reasons for 
providing remuneration 
through housing rather than 
wages.  Likely to be 
particularly appropriate for 
those with land for which 
residential planning 
permission can be obtained. 
Employees only want such 
housing if they obtain clear 
benefits and are not 
restricted from entering 
‘normal’ owner occupation.  
Consumers generally find 
shared equity arrangements, 
as currently operating, 
unattractive. 
Percent of initial 
subsidy directed at 
affordable housing 
Depends on capacity to 
target.  Savings, interest rate 
and relocation packages 
likely to be relatively poorly 
targeted unless limited to 
defined groups. 
Targeting not likely to be 
very tight because  
employment requirements 
not necessarily congruent 
with affordable housing 
requirements. 
Comparison with 
Social Housing 
Grant 
Addressing a different group  
Appropriateness for 
particular groups 
Yes—notably key workers, 
employees with shorter-term 
housing needs—trainees, etc. 
 
Practical issues Many – but employers are a 
good conduit for operating 
the schemes above.  Unlikely 
to want to tie up assets over 
long periods or be involved in 
management—so need 
market into which assets can 
be sold. 
Make  best  consideration 
transparent.  Address 
practical issues relating to 
shared-equity schemes. 
(Necessary also for Policy 
1).  Concerns about 
managing vacancy and 
access.  Need for flexibility 
in relation to changes in 
economic environment. 
Overall evaluation Should be included in the 
more detailed assessment in 
all cases.  Issue of taxation of 
non pecuniary benefits needs 
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specific examination. 
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Policy 5:  Encouraging mixed-use and housing-only 
developments on sites previously designated for 
nonresidential development 
 
 
 In principle Evidence 
Coverage/can it be 
targeted? 
Nonresidential sites.  Could 
be targeted to certain areas 
Hammersmith and Fulham 
and rural exceptions 
policies.   
Formal incidence On landowners and 
developers. 
Some transfers to lower 
output and higher costs and 
prices. 
Depth of subsidy Depends on negotiation or 
tariff 
 
Likely market 
response 
There will be some benefits 
from generating a flatter 
playing field between 
residential and non-
residential sites. 
Mixed use and additional 
taxation will be unpopular 
and could slow the 
development process.  The 
costs of additional regulation 
could be offset by fiscal 
incentives. 
Percent of initial 
subsidy directed at 
affordable housing 
Depends on ‘tariff’ and 
negotiations 
 
Comparison with 
Social Housing 
Grant 
Paid by the market rather than 
government—generates 
different outcomes. 
Evidence on S106 suggests 
that amount of additional 
housing achieved is limited. 
Appropriateness for 
particular groups 
Can be targeted—e.g. by 
employer involvement. 
 
Practical issues Loss of employment land.  
Fundamental link between 
landowners, planning system 
and fiscal instrument. 
Keeping transactions and 
negotiatons costs down to a 
reasonable level.  
Management costs of mixed 
use.  Attitudes of financial 
institutions could be a 
problem.  Costs of housing 
in mixed use—especially 
service charges. 
Overall evaluation Worth it, especially in 
metropolitan areas if some of 
the emphasis can be on 
enabling.  Makes sense in 
terms of flat playing field 
between different types of 
development and generated 
need for affordable housing. 
Benefits of large-scale 
funding unlikely to be 
realised.  Congruent with 
Green Paper proposals. 
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Policy 6:  VAT reduction for renovation of affordable housing 
 
 
 In principle Evidence 
Coverage/can it be 
targeted? 
If limited to major renovation 
by RSLs, targetted at 
affordable housing. 
France: HLMs 
Spain, Italy, Belgium etc. all 
target affordable housing. 
Formal incidence Goes to builder/developer Likely to be split between 
client and developer—
depends on state of market 
and negotiation skills. 
Depth of subsidy 12.5% on renovation costs France:  Approximately 
12.7% 
Likely market 
response 
Limited Too early to look at 
conversion experience in 
UK; no evidence of 
evaluation elsewhere. 
Percent of initial 
subsidy directed at 
affordable housing 
There would be large-scale 
deadweight losses in the case 
of renovation which would 
anyway be undertaken. 
Difficulties in delineating 
renovation from major 
repair. 
Comparison with 
Social Housing 
Grant 
If limited to RSLs makes 
SHG more cost-effective. 
 
Appropriateness for 
particular groups 
Additional benefit to social 
landlords; some potential for 
helping to bring private 
empty homes back into use 
leased through RSLs. 
 
Practical issues Relatively easy to implement 
except for concern about 
major-repair leakage and 
private leasing. 
 
Overall evaluation All renovation would be 
treated as conversions are 
now.  Cost reduction and 
supply response likely to be 
small. 
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Conclusions 
 
A version of Policy 1 has just been introduced in the form of the Community 
Investment Tax Credit.  This makes it easier to develop a broader scheme 
concentrating on particular areas, dwelling types and occupant groups.  It will work 
effectively only if the credits can be traded and land supply can be increased. 
 
Under Policy 2, extending Homebuy and the Starter Homes Initiative into a more 
coherent but carefully targeted scheme appears appropriate, as it can help fulfil 
reasonable aspirations of lower-income employed households. 
 
Savings schemes, as set out in Policy 3, can only provide very limited help.  
Extending income-tax relief to employer contributions to mortgage payments would 
have more impact, but goes against general tax principles. 
 
Employers clearly have a potential role as partners in Policy 4, in providing land, 
developing shared-equity schemes and facilitating the implementation of other fiscal 
instruments. Whether employers become involved depends partly on whether they 
perceive particular relative advantages to providing housing assistance rather than 
increased pay. 
 
Policy 5 envisions a flatter playing field between residential and non-residential sites 
in terms of the requirement to provide affordable housing, as set out in the Green 
Paper.  This could increase the number of sites coming forward for residential and 
particularly affordable-housing use.  However, the policy would have to be combined 
with fiscal incentives such as Policy 1 to generate large-scale changes. 
 
Reducing the rate of VAT on renovation, under Policy 6, would be sensible in terms 
of incentives. Restricting the tax reduction to RSLs would concentrate the policy on 
affordable housing and make it easier to monitor. 
 
There are a number of non-fiscal modifications which could make the system work 
very much better.  They include in particular (I) clarifying the definition of best 
consideration so it includes allocating land for affordable housing at sub-market prices 
and (ii) developing standard contracts and transparent frameworks for shared-equity 
arrangements so that both employers and employees can better evaluate the schemes.  
There could be large benefits from increasing scale to provide incentives for 
institutional finance but these are a long way off. 
 
Overall there is a strong case for experimenting with Policy 1 and for developing a 
more coherent approach to demand assistance as defined in Policy 2.  The other 
policies can act in support of these two more fundamental changes.  
 
None of these policies will effectively address the same needs as Social Housing 
Grant, which is concentrated on lower-income households with longer-term needs, 
and provides higher subsidies and greater targeting.   Instead they can supplement that 
provision by bringing in different players, greater choice and a market-oriented 
approach.  They will work best if their use can be directly combined with expansion 
of land supply. 
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ANNEX 1:  POLICIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
    
Category 1:  International demand-side tax measures  
 
1.1 Mortgage interest tax deductible 
Many countries allow this.  In some countries, such as the Netherlands, 
mortgage interest is deductible, but owner-occupiers are taxed on the imputed 
rental value of their homes.  In others, such as the USA, mortgage interest is 
deductible at marginal rate for all but the very largest loans, but there is no 
corresponding tax on imputed rental value.  In Belgium the amount deductible 
is related to the size of the family, and is higher for new buildings; it declines 
over time.  In France 25% of interest could be deducted up to a ceiling that 
depended on the number of children in the family and whether the building 
was new or old. The deduction is no longer allowed for purchases agreed  
after the 1st of January ’98.  Imputed rent is not taxed. 
 
Ireland allowed deduction of 80% of mortgage interest at the marginal rate; 
this was due to change (in 1996) to standard rate.  However, 100% of 
mortgage interest is tax deductible for first-time buyers up to £5000 (married) 
and £2500 (single) for the first five years after purchase. 
 
Italy allows a percentage of interest on loans for repair to be deducted. 
 
1.2 Owner-occupiers can claim depreciation 
In Germany owner-occupiers could deduct 5% of construction costs annually 
for the first eight years.  This was replaced in 1996 by a concession limited to 
households under a certain income threshold.  Such households could deduct 
5% of the building cost of a new house up to DM5000 annually, or 2.5% of the 
value of a second-hand house up to DM 2500 annually.  Families with children 
got extra amounts.  If this results in negative income tax, the credit could be 
held over to use in other years.  In 2000 this tax relief was replaced by a cash 
allowance. 
 
1.3 Preferential tax treatment of home-savings plans 
In Canada during the 1970s any resident non-homeowner could contribute 
$1000 per year, up to a total of $10,000, in a registered home-ownership 
savings plan.  Contributions were tax-deductible and the income was not taxed 
while in the plan.  No tax was payable if the capital and interest were used to 
buy an owner-occupied house. 
 
In 1965 France introduced Housing Savings Schemes, under which households 
could save up to FF 100,000 for construction or repair of a house.  Interest 
was paid tax-free.  There was no requirement for regular deposits, and after 
18 months the saver had the right to a loan related to the size of his savings.  
In 1969 Housing Savings Plans were introduced.  The new regulations 
required regular annual deposits, and the account had to be maintained for a 
minimum of four years. 
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In Germany, holders of Bausparkassen accounts whose income is above the 
threshold for government grants (see below) can receive interest on these 
accounts tax-free.  
 
1.4 Rent payments tax deductible 
In Ireland the over-55s can treat rent to private landlords as a tax allowance.  
Italy allows low-income renters to deduct housing expenditure.  In Greece 
tenants may deduct 30% of their rent, up to 15% of taxable net income. 
 
1.5 Tax credits for low-income tenants 
The state of California has a small fixed renters’ tax credit (maximum 
$120/year); the legislature has proposed a special renters’ tax credit of $500 
for entry-level teachers and police and fire officers living in high-rent areas. 
 
1.6 Exemption from transfer tax for first-time buyers 
Greece allows this; the size of the exemption is related to family size. 
 
1.7 Tax relief for employee on employer-run house savings schemes, to equate 
with treatment of pension contributions 
In Hungary employers provide preferential loans to employees; a significant 
share of firms’ profits are spent on supporting dwelling purchases by their 
employees.  From 1995 in Switzerland, people covered by an occupational 
pension scheme were allowed to use part of their accumulated equity to 
acquire an owner-occupied dwelling, pay down existing mortgage debt, or buy 
shares in a housing co-operative.  If they were under 50 years old they could 
use all their equity; if over 50 they could use equity to the value of what they 
had at 50, or one-half. 
 
1.8 Property-tax relief for low-income households 
In the Netherlands low-income households are exempt from paying the 40% of  
property tax collected from the user of the dwelling (the other 60% is paid by 
the owner). 
 
1.9 Exemption from transfer tax for new homes  
Ireland exempts new homes from stamp duty. 
 
 
Category  2:  International demand-side subsidies 
 
2.1 Housing allowance 
Almost all countries have some housing allowance scheme. 
 
2.2 Subsidies to savings for house purchase (interest subsidies or one-off grants on 
house purchase) 
The German Bausparen, or contract savings and loans system, offers loans on 
the basis of specific house-savings contracts, under which borrowers have to 
make regular deposits in advance until a certain savings target is reached, 
when the they become eligible for a mortgage.  The government pays 10% of 
the annual savings amount as a subsidy to low-income households.  Spain 
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gives grants to buyers with housing-savings accounts at the time of house 
purchase.  France pays an interest premium to savings for homeownership. 
 
Under a 1980 law, the Finnish government pays an interest subsidy of 70% of 
the interest rate over 4.5% for loans taken out under the ASP programmes.  
This is designed to help first-time buyers between 18 and 30 years old.  
Borrowers must have saved a down payment of 15% over at least two years.  
The interest on savings if 1% + 2-4% (negotiated with the bank) and is tax 
free.  There are upper limits on the loan sum, depending on where the dwelling 
is in Finland.  The maximum was needed in 1992 when 5% of all new housing 
loans were ASP.  Interest has risen again since upper limits were raised. 
 
2.3 Subsidised mortgages for low-income households 
Spain subsidises mortgages for low-income purchasers of new units of 
“regulated housing”, which must met certain criteria and be registered with 
the government.  The amount qualifying for a subsidy depends on the buyer’s 
income and the size of the dwelling.  If the buyer sells in less than five years he 
must return the subsidy with interest; if not, after five years he is re-assessed 
for continuing subsidy.  There is a similar programme for used dwellings. 
 
In Austria the state offers loans for new construction, the amount depending on 
family size.   For low-income households these loans are interest-free.  
France’s PAP programme offered subsidised loans for owner-occupation.  
These were only for principal homes for low-income borrowers; the dwelling 
had to meet certain size and cost requirements, and be new or professionally 
refurbished.  France introduced 0% mortgages for home ownership in the 
subsidised sector in 1995.  In 1993 France introduced a new loan programme 
for low-income owner-occupiers who wanted to renovate their homes 
themselves. 
 
In the Netherlands the government offers three types of subsidy, depending on 
house values.  For the cheapest houses, the government pays the principal and 
interest on a part (up to 48,000 florins, depending on the buyer’s income) of 
the mortgage.  The subsidy is treated as taxable income.   For somewhat more 
expensive houses there is a fixed contribution from the government for five 
years (also taxable, income cap applies).  For the third band of houses there is 
a price cap but no income cap; these attract a one-off contribution from the 
government. 
 
In New Zealand before 1993 the government subsidised loans for low-income 
wage earners.  The Australian government offers short-term help for low-
income home buyers in difficulty with mortgage repayments. 
 
In Canada in the mid-1970s the Assisted Home Ownership Programme was 
designed to enable low-income families to buy homes using less than 25% of 
their income to repay principal and interest.  A government corporation 
provided interest-free loans to buyers for five years.   
 
In Argentina households are lent 5% of the purchase price at the beginning of 
construction and up to 33% of the mortgage payments for a ten year load 
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which they repay at 4% interest over the following ten years.  This is paid for 
by the National Housing Fund (FONAVI) originally financed from an 
employment surcharge;  now from a petrol tax (Slemenson, 2000). 
 
2.4 Grants to first-time buyers, Homebuy, shared ownership 
The Spanish region of Catalonia offers grants to buyers under 30.  Australia 
gives AUS $7000 to first-time buyers, with an additional $7000 for those who 
buy new homes (reduced to $10,000 total for 2002).  There are no income or 
dwelling-cost restrictions.  Germany offers subsidies to first-time buyers, 
related to their income level and the number of children they have. 
 
In New Zealand from 1986 to 1993 the Homestart programme offered grants 
to bridge the gap between the savings of low-income households and the 
required deposit. 
  
Ireland has a programme of shared ownership, where the house is part-owned 
by the occupier, part by the state.  The occupier pays rent on the part owned by 
the state, and mortgage repayments or interest on the rest.  The occupier can 
buy part or all of the remaining equity when his income allows. 
 
2.5 Grants for low-income buyers (not tied to house savings) 
Under the US 1968 Housing Act, private buyers bought homes from developers 
and paid a percentage of their income; the federal government made up the 
difference.  In Hungary, the state gives a grant to assist with down payments or 
construction costs for families.  This can cover up to 45% of construction 
costs, depending on the number of children in the family. 
 
 
Category 3:  International demand-side regulations 
 
3.1 Government assigns housing to low-income households 
 Common for social housing in many countries. 
 
 
Category 4: International supply-side tax relief 
 
Income tax 
 
4.1 Providers of social housing exempt from income tax 
The Netherlands and Denmark exempt providers of social housing from 
income tax.   In Germany they were exempt until 1990. 
 
4.2 Tax credits for construction of affordable housing  
The USA allows developers of low-income housing to take a tax credit (set 
directly against the tax bill) of 9% of reckonable construction costs annually 
for ten years.  A certain proportion of the units in the development must be for 
low-income households.  The tax credits are allocated to specific low-income 
housing projects by state housing authorities; developers raise equity by 
selling the credits (selling prices are typically about 60 cents on the dollar).  
To qualify for the credit, the developer must undertake substantial expenditure 
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for construction or rehabilitation.  The credit is earned over 15 years, but is 
taken over ten.  It is subject to recapture with interest if the project (or more 
than a one-third interest in it) is sold before the end of the 15-year compliance 
period, or if the project is not occupied by low-income households. 
 
German allows tax relief for construction of dwellings to be let at below 
market rents; a percentage of the capital invested may be set against other 
income from all sources. 
 
4.3 Depreciation for rental units 
Landlords were permitted to depreciate their units over 15 years in the USA 
for a period during the 1980s; this has now changed to 27.5 years.  In 1990 
Germany increased the allowed rate of depreciation to try to boost the supply 
of rental housing.  
 
Australia allows investors in newly constructed private rental housing to 
depreciate their investment at a rate of 2.5% per yea.  Canada allows 4%. 
  
4.4 Landlords can deduct interest on loans and operating expenses 
Germany, the USA and Canada allow landlords to deduct interest on loans 
and operating expenses from taxable income.. 
 
4.5 Landlords can set rental losses against other income 
Germany and the US allow this.  In the 1960s Finland exempted investors in 
rental housing from income and property tax; these provisions were changed 
by 1972.   Canada allows private landlords to offset losses on rental properties  
against other taxable income. 
 
4.6 Lower tax rate for landlords’ capital gains 
The USA taxed landlords’ capital gains at a special lower rate until 1986. 
 
4.7 Tax relief for interest from mortgage-backed securities used to fund low-
interest mortgages or low-income housing 
Such securities are issued by US states or municipalities to fund affordable 
housing. 
 
4.8 Allow capital outlays on construction/conversion of rental property to be 
offset against rental income 
Ireland allows this.  These outlays can be deducted from rental income from 
the property in question or from other property owned by the landlord.  Italy 
allows a percentage of the cost of renovation (of rental or owner-occupied 
property) to be set directly against the income tax bill. 
 
4.9 Preferential tax treatment for housing finance institutions 
German Bausparen operate under a special tax regime. 
 
Land/property tax 
 
4.13 Discount for new/renovated houses, or abatement for specified period 
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In Sweden new and renovated houses benefit from a ten-year discount on 
property tax.  In France new homes are exempted from land taxes; 
construction for the private rented sector is exempt from land tax for two 
years. All new dwellings are exempted from property tax for two years 
 
VAT 
 
4.14 Reduced rate on conversions, new build 
Spain gives a discount of 6% on VAT for new homes. 
 
4.15 RSLs pay lower VAT 
In France HLM organisations (like RSLs) pay a lower rate of VAT. 
 
 
Category 5:  Supply-side subsidies 
 
5.1 Grants for construction or renovation of affordable housing 
Spain provides grants of 10 to 25% for the cost of building affordable housing.  
Sweden provides grants for developers (private or public) building affordable 
rental housing.  There is a cost ceiling, and the developer must make a 
commitment to rent to low-income households.  The grant covers 
approximately 15% of building costs. 
 
Germany provides subsidies at a level designed to cover all costs exceeding 
the predetermined social (below-market) rent.  The dwellings must meet 
certain standards, and tenancies are open to certain groups only.  Social rents 
are essentially fixed; only some cost-based rent increases are allowed. 
 
Switzerland offers a six-year subsidy to encourage renovation of existing 
housing (not necessarily affordable).  It covers 2% of the total cost of 
upgrading the housing unit. 
 
France offered a grant of 12.7% of the cost of schemes to construct new social 
housing, or to renovate existing stock.  This is associated with a subsidised 
loan (PLA).  Private developers are also eligible, if their developments meet 
certain physical standards and they observe rent limits.  A higher level of 
grant—20%--is available for developments aimed at very low-income 
households; permitted rents are correspondingly lower.  Another scheme 
(ANAH) was created to improve existing rented stock owned by private 
landlords.  It covers 25% of improvement costs up to a standard limit; 
buildings must be over 15 years old.  There are no constraints on rents for 
housing improved using an ANAH grant, but the renter is eligible for a higher 
housing allowance if the landlord accepts rent regulation. Homeowners under 
a certain income ceiling are eligible for another grant (PAH).  The ANAH and 
PAH grants cover 20 to 35% of repair costs up to a standard cost limit. 
 
 
5.2 Subsidised loans for developers of affordable housing 
Spain provides subsidised loans, as well as grants.  The USA provides them 
subject to rents remaining below a specified level for 20 years.  Germany 
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provides preferential loans to public or private-sector providers of affordable 
housing; the dwellings must be operated as social housing for a period of 30 
years (originally 60).  Lettings are restricted to certain income groups, and 
rents are held below market level.  Sweden subsidises interest for new 
construction or renovation; the subsidy decreases year by year, and is 
calculated on the basis of a standardised investment cost rather than actual 
cost.  The subsidy is available to developers of both private and social 
housing, and is not targeted to low-income groups.  Interest subsidies are now 
being phased out. 
 
In Finland after 1949 the state granted low-interest loans for construction of 
rental units (covering 60% of costs) or single-family homes (40%); there was 
no income restriction at first.  The government still grants low-cost 
construction loans, but now eligibility is limited by household income and 
family size.  Equally 80% of the government subsidised production is to be 
concentrated in the six growing regions with 50% in Helsinki alone. 
 
Canada’s Assisted Rental Program, which ran only from 1975 to 1978, offered 
concessionary loans over ten years to facilitate the construction of affordable 
private rented housing. 
 
France’s grant programme for social housing (described above) includes an 
element of subsidised loan. 
 
5.3 Provision of land for affordable housing at below market value or free 
Spain does this.  In Italy, local authorities are empowered to acquire, by 
compulsory purchase, land for housing programmes. 
 
5.5 Government guarantees for housing association loans 
In Denmark local and central government guarantee housing-association 
borrowing. 
 
5.6 Government guarantees of rent or mortgage payments from low-income 
households 
The French government guarantees rent payments.  The US government, 
through the Federal Housing Administration, Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mac, 
guarantees the mortgage payments of low-income borrowers.  In eastern 
German states the federal government has introduced public guarantees for 
private mortgages, to overcome the requirement for high down payments. 
 
 
Category 6: International supply-side regulations 
 
6.1 Require developers to include certain % of affordable housing  
In Ireland, under the Planning and Development Act 2000, local authorities 
can acquire up to 20% of the area of development sites purchased by private 
developers for affordable housing, paying either existing use or agricultural 
value. 
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Sweden is changing it cadastral system to make mixed used development and 
especially low cost housing in areas not zoned or intended for residential use. 
 
6.2 Rent control 
Denmark has traditional rent regulation for private rental housing, with low 
legal maximum rents.  Many countries—for example Switzerland and 
Germany—control rents for dwellings built with government subsidies.  
Landlords are permitted to set rents at a level that will cover costs only. 
 
In Austria, rent levels of almost all rented flats in multi-storey buildings are 
restricted by government legislation.  There are rent limits for both new and 
existing tenancy contracts.  Rent increases for existing tenants are allowed 
only for inflation or to cover urgent maintenance. 
 
6.3 Require employers to provide housing 
This was common practice in transition economies. 
 
6.4 Prohibit move of rental flats to owner occupation 
In Germany, local regulations inhibit the movement of rental flats into 
homeownership. 
 
 
Category 7:  International other measures 
 
7 Advice to low-income households on homeownership 
In the US, the government provides advice on passing credit tests and 
managing mortgage commitments. It is often organised through Community 
Development Corporations (CDCs) and targeted at ethnic minority groups, 
whose levels of owner occupation are lower. 
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ANNEX 2a:  AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TAX CREDITS 
 
 
Why is it that low-income housing tax credits have worked well in the US?  Part of 
the answer is because people respond to incentives.  To illustrate, assume that the 
residential market is consists of n identical properties with an age distribution of f(a) 
and ages (a0, a1, a2, ..., an) in period t = 0.  Owners at any period t > 0 must decide 
whether or not to rehabilitate their structures and the extent of rehabilitation.  The 
decision to rehabilitate occurs when the marginal revenue, MR, from rehabilitation is 
expected to be greater than the marginal cost, MC.  Here, marginal revenue consists of 
the expected increase in rental revenues plus the increased sales price at reversion, 
discounted at the appropriate discount rate.  Marginal costs include the costs of 
rehabilitation incurred in period t, less any reduction in operating costs over time, plus 
any increment (or less any decrement) in costs associated with sale at reversion, again 
discounted at the appropriate discount rate.  
 
Further, we assume that a tax credit at rate α is allowed on rehabilitation expenditures.  
For convenience, we also assume the marginal cost of rehabilitation is invariant with 
respect to the degree of rehabilitation for structures of all vintages over the range of 
analysis.  The baseline marginal cost in the absence of a tax credit is given by MC0.  
MC1 and MC2 then represent the marginal cost of rehabilitation when successively 
more generous rehabilitation tax credits are allowed.  More specifically, MC1 is 
defined by MC1 = (1 - α1)MC0 and MC1 is defined by MC2 = (1 - α2)MC1, where α2 > 
α1.   
 
Now consider the marginal revenue from rehabilitation.  Marginal revenue should 
vary significantly for structures of different vintages.  This is depicted in Figure 1 for 
three different structures: new, middle-aged, and older structures, where the vertical 
axis represents the marginal cost of revenue from rehabilitation and the horizontal 
axis represents the degree of rehabilitation in units of physical stock.  In Figure 1, any 
age ai greater than a0 gives a higher MRi.  Notice that, because the marginal revenue 
curve MR0 for newly built structures is below the marginal cost curve except for the 
extreme case of MC2, owners will not rehabilitate new structures under any but the 
most extreme tax credit scenarios.  It is also important to note that, even in the case of 
an extremely high tax credit, the equilibrium level of rehabilitation for a new 
structure, q02*, is quite low. 
 
For mid-life structures, the marginal revenue curve is given by MR1.  Here again, the 
value of MR1 is such that no mid-life structure would be rehabilitated under a tax 
scenario of zero tax credit.  However, under a moderate tax-credit regime represented 
by the marginal cost curve MC1, rehabilitation would take place up to the point q11*.  
It can also be seen that a deeper tax credit results in rehabilitation at a higher 
equilibrium level of rehabilitation, i.e., at q12* rather than q11*.  
    
With regard to older structures, the curve in Figure 1 labeled MR2 shows that, in the 
absence of a tax credit, it is profitable to rehabilitate older structures up to the level 
q20*.   Note that the result of increasing the tax credit in this case is simply to raise the 
level of rehabilitation expenditures.  With a moderate tax credit, for example, 
rehabilitation will occur up to the point q21*.  Meanwhile, the presence of an extreme 
tax credit serves to increase the equilibrium level of rehabilitation to q22*.   
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The second reason why low-income housing tax credits work well has to do with size.  
The private rental housing market in the US is large in comparison with that of most 
European countries. The contrast with the UK is especially noteworthy.  The size of 
the market makes possible investment by large US institutional investors (including 
publicly traded property companies) looking to underwrite large-scale projects.  The 
same cannot be said for most European countries (including the UK).  Consequently, 
the risks associated with private rental housing development and redevelopment in 
most European countries and in the UK tend to be narrowly shared.  But it is only as 
the risks become more widely shared will the average return on redevelopment begin 
to fall.  In terms of the above analysis, this generally means that most European 
countries (including the UK) face a larger marginal cost curve MC0, holding all else 
constant. 
 
A concern with the use of low-income housing tax credits (in the US and elsewhere) 
is the issue of slippage.  To illustrate, in the simple case where there are just the three 
structures shown in Figure 1, and where there is a moderate tax credit on all 
rehabilitation expenditures, the proportion of the tax-credit investment spending (in 
physical units) that is spending that would have been invested otherwise (slippage, or 
deadweight loss) is q20*/( q21* + q11*).  In the high tax credit case, the degree of 
slippage is q20*/( q22* + q12* + q02*).  Since q20*/(q22* + q12* + q02*) < q20*/( q21* + q11*), 
or equivalently, it is suggested that tax-credit-induced investment spending increases 
as the tax credit increases, all else held constant. 
 
The above analysis can easily be extended to the case of new development.  The 
decision to build new occurs when the marginal revenue, MR, from new development 
is expected to be greater than the marginal cost, MC.  Here, marginal revenue consists 
of the expected rental revenues (not the incremental rental revenues) plus the sales 
price (not the incremental price) at reversion, discounted at the appropriate discount 
rate.  Marginal costs include the costs of development (including both hard and soft 
costs), again discounted at the appropriate discount rate.  Further, assume that a 
moderate tax credit at rate α1 is allowed on development costs.  As in Figure 1, this 
would have the effect of lowering the marginal cost curve from MC0 to MC1.  As a 
result, construction spending (in physical units) would increase from q20* to q21*.  In 
this case, the proportion of construction spending that would have been invested 
otherwise is q20*/q21*.  This amount will obviously vary from metropolitan area to 
metropolitan area (and from country to country) depending on the positions of the 
marginal revenue, MR, and marginal cost, MC0, curves. 
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ANNEX 2b: TAX RELIEF FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING: SOME PRACTICAL 
ISSUES 
 
The purpose of the tax relief would be to enable housing to be supplied at sub-market 
rents or house prices to households that could not afford full market prices, but could 
nevertheless afford more than the rents charged by housing associations.  One way of 
confining access to dwellings provided by the tax credit would be a maximum income 
limit.  Income limits for access to local authority of housing association dwellings 
have never been formally used in Britain, though they have been used in the USA and 
Germany.  An income limit would in principle be straightforward to administer, but 
would have to be varied geographically.  Incomes sufficient for paying market prices 
or rents in a low-price area would be too low in a high price area.  The geography of 
house prices is complex, with pockets of high prices in low-income areas.  A balance 
would have to be struck between avoiding undue complexity and recognising the way 
in which ability to pay market prices and rents varies from area to area.  Mortgage 
outgoings in relation to house prices depend on interest rates, so the income limit 
would have to set with an eye to a likely range of interest rates.  Precision would be 
unattainable.   
 
The income limits would apply in the first instance when the dwelling was sold, or let 
for the first time.  With sales, any future changes in purchasers’ income would be of 
no relevance to the original investors.  With lettings there would be a question about 
what to do if individual tenants’ incomes rose above the maximum.  This issue has not 
thus far arisen in Britain, because neither local-authority nor housing-association 
tenancies have been subject to maximum income limits.  But in Germany tenants of 
subsidised rented dwellings whose incomes rise above the maximum limits are subject 
to a surcharge on their rent.  In the USA, either the resident pays ‘excess rent’ or, in 
cases of very high rises in income, the tenancy can be terminated.  Neither would 
seem attractive in British circumstances.   
 
Upper income limits are a familiar feature of subsidy and tax relief schemes in other 
countries.  But the structure of housing benefit in Britain, with the benefit meeting 
100% of the rent at the margin, raises the question of a minimum income or other 
restriction to prevent the dwellings from being rented by households with low 
incomes with most of the rent paid by housing benefit.  That would not be the purpose 
of rented dwellings provided using tax credits, which would be for households that 
could afford more than housing-association rents but not full market rents.  To restrict 
the dwellings to the category of households for which they were intended, one method 
might be a minimum income limit or procedures to make the rents of these dwellings 
ineligible for housing benefit.  Making the rents ineligible for housing benefit could 
however result in hardship for tenants who lost their jobs, or whose marriages or 
partnerships broke down, or who for other reasons ceased to have an income 
sufficient to pay the rent.  Probably preferable would be for prospective new tenants 
to be required to show that they could afford the rent from their own funds.  That is 
very commonly the practice of private landlords and their managing agents. 
 
With maximum income limits there is the further question of what to do if too few 
households with incomes below the maximum limit apply for tenancies.  The answer 
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would have to be to let to households above the limit rather than leave the dwellings 
standing empty.  Safeguards would be needed, because to let to households that could 
afford market rents would obviously be to the advantage of the developer.  There 
might be a requirement to advertise the tenancies; or a more formal alternative might 
be something on the lines of practice in Germany where the landlord of subsidised 
rented dwellings who claims that he cannot find enough tenants with incomes within 
the income limit must notify the local authority housing office, which must then 
produce potential tenants from its housing list.  If it cannot, then the landlord can let 
to any tenant he wishes, irrespective of maximum income limits. 
 
These issues do not arise with dwellings built for sale and sold, because once the 
dwelling is sold, the housing company’s interest is limited to using the sale proceeds 
to produce a cash flow out of which to pay the interest due to investors; it has no 
further interest in the dwelling itself.  Important for value for money, however, is to 
ensure that the buyers cannot quickly resell on the open market and pocket the 
difference between the market value and the much lower price paid when the dwelling 
was bought.  A way to do this would be to impose a legal charge on the dwelling (in 
the Land Registry’s Charges Register) that on sale within a specified term of years a 
sum would be payable equal to the difference between the market value of the 
dwelling at the time of first sale and the submarket price for which it was actually 
sold, or a proportion of it.  The amount payable would presumably be indexed, either 
to the RPI or house prices.  The payment would be made to the Exchequer, as a form 
of “clawback” or recapture of the tax relief.  The amount of repayment could be 
tapered, for instance the full amount if the dwelling were resold less than five years 
after purchase, and then 90, 80, 60, 40 or 20%, and then nil after ten years.  Needless 
to say, these figures are only examples.  If there were any uncertainties about whether 
such charges could be imposed under the present law of charges on land, they could 
be dealt with in the primary legislation setting up the scheme.  Special provisions (too 
technical to discuss here) would be needed about liabilities of mortgagees in 
possession so as to make dwellings subject to the proposed charge acceptable to 
mortgage lenders as security for loans. 
 
A form of leasehold could be applied to ensure that dwellings sold originally at sub-
market prices to households within the income limits continued to be occupied by 
households within those limits after successive resales.  The original developer (or its 
successor in title) would be the ground landlord, and its consent would be required to 
assigning the lease.  Consent could be withheld if the purchaser’s income was above 
the income limit.  Whether such a system would be acceptable to prospective house 
purchasers (and mortgage lenders) is uncertain.  So, perhaps, is whether the law of 
leasehold enfranchisement would allow home owners to “escape”. 
 
Recapture of tax relief given in respect of dwellings for letting at sub-market rents 
would require a different procedure.  It would apply where a new letting was made 
within a specified period of time to a household whose income was above the limit.  
The length of this period is for consideration.  Under the Low Income Household Tax 
Credit (LIHTC) scheme in the USA, the period within which there is a liability to 
recapture of the tax credit is 15 years.  Letting within the clawback period to a tenant 
with income over the limit would result in an obligation to repay all or part of the tax 
relief.  One way of determining the amount to be clawed back would be pro-rata to the 
number of years remaining of the clawback period.  If, for example, this period were 
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15 years and the dwelling was re-let to a tenant with income above the limit after five 
years, 10/15 (i.e., 2/3) of the amount of tax relief would be payable to the Exchequer.  
The amount would probably be indexed, as with the sum payable for early resale.  A 
possible refinement would be to allow part of the tax relief recaptured to be reclaimed 
if the dwelling were again let to households within the income limit.  If, for instance, 
the dwelling were re-let after five years to a tenant with income above the limit and 
clawback of tax relief incurred, but then five years later re-let to a new tenant with 
income below the limit, a pro-rata part of the amount clawed back could be reclaimed. 
 
With renting there is nothing analogous to registering a legal charge with the Land 
Registry to initiate a clawback of all or part of difference between market value at the 
time of the original sale and the price paid.  A different procedure would therefore be 
required for initiating a clawback if a dwelling were re-let to a tenant with an income 
above the limit.  The original developer or its successors in title could be obliged to 
notify the Inland Revenue (because tax relief is involved) of all re-lettings to new 
tenants.  To avoid initiating the clawback procedure the company would have to 
provide a certificate stating that the new tenant’s income was within the limit.  What 
procedures the company would have to follow to assess the tenant’s income would be 
part of the subordinate legislation setting up the scheme. 
 
Tension between value for money and protecting public funds 
 
In a scheme such as that outlined in this paper there is an inherent tension between 
offering sufficient incentives to private enterprise to operate the scheme and provide 
the houses, and ensuring value for money by ensuring that the houses are sold or 
rented to the households for whom they are intended (“targeting”) and that the selling 
prices or rents are reasonable in relation to costs and the amount of the tax relief.  
What from one standpoint might appear bureaucratic and off-putting to developers 
could well appear from another point of view essential procedures for ensuring value 
for money from public funds. 
 
Four key aspects can be distinguished: 
 
(a) The maximum income limits for tenants and purchasers; 
(b) Procedures to ensure that lettings and sales are made only to households that 
qualify within those limits; 
(c) The amount of tax relief; and 
(d) Formulas for determining rents or selling prices as a function of costs and the 
amount of tax relief. 
 
Of these (a) and (c) are policy matters; but they interlock in that the upper limit for 
income must be high enough for there to be households within it that can afford the 
rents and prices, even if they are at sub-market levels.  Regarding issue (b), 
procedures to ensure that the tenants or purchasers have incomes within the maximum 
limits, and that new tenants have sufficient means to afford the rents without calling 
on housing benefit, do not raise issues of principle: the question is one of how 
thorough the developer would be required to be.  Mortgage lenders assess the incomes 
of would-be borrowers as a matter of ordinary business, so a procedure on the lines of 
that followed by mortgage lenders would not seem oppressive or overly bureaucratic.   
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The question is what else, if anything, would be required, and what external checks 
would be made on the accuracy of income testing.  Mortgage lenders have a financial 
interest in assessing potential borrowers’ incomes accurately—but their interest is in 
ensuring that income is high, not low.  And the developer would not be at financial 
risk from selling or letting to households with incomes above the limit, so for 
targeting and the protection of public funds some checking would be inevitable.  The 
question would be how much.  In the US, state authorities administering the LIHTC 
have developed a detailed income-verification process that is used to determine 
household eligibility for the dwellings. 
 
More important, however, would be how to determine rents or selling prices in 
relation to costs and the amount of tax relief.  Since the dwellings would be sold or let 
at sub-market prices or rents, market forces could not provide the answers; 
administrative methods would be required.  What rate of return would have to be 
available to attract developers (or others) is hard to assess.  So too is the rate of 
interest that would have to be offered to investors when their return comes partly from 
tax relief and partly from net interest paid by the housing company.  For building for 
sale at sub-market rents the risk would seem to be the usual developers’ risk of cost 
over-runs and changes in market conditions making the dwellings harder to sell.  But 
once the dwellings are sold their risks are at an end (apart, possibly, from claims about 
dwelling defects).   
 
With renting, in contrast, the relationship is for the long term, with risks of voids and 
bad debts, unforeseen needs for major repairs, and changes in running costs 
(maintenance and management).  A rent set at the first letting to cover these costs 
would have to be reviewed in future years to take account of changes in costs.  A ‘cost 
plus’ provision for increases in management and maintenance costs would probably 
not be acceptable to tenants: there would be scope for most of the disputes that are 
well known in connection with service charges in leasehold flats.  Increases in 
running costs, or substantial costs for major repairs, could be an important risk that 
would have to be provided for if developers or others were to be persuaded to invest.  
With an unfamiliar system the return required to attract investment might appear too 
high with hindsight; but that is an aspect of the tension between getting results and 
protection of public funds. 
 
Prior approval of individual projects would be necessary to enable capital to be raised 
from investors on terms of which tax credits are an essential element.  Part of the 
process of prior approval would be a business plan to specify expected costs and 
proposed selling prices and rents; this is typical in the US.  In setting out the volume 
of supporting evidence required, the rigour with which the plan would be examined 
and clarifications sought, a balance would need to be struck between making the 
scheme attractive to investors and protecting public funds.  A thorough examination 
of the business plan would take time and could lead to complaint about “bureaucratic 
delays”.  On the other hand, a National Audit Office investigation that concluded that 
inadequate controls had allowed housing companies to make profits that were 
disproportionate to the housing provided would bring this method of providing 
affordable housing into disrepute.  There is an analogy with the US “Section 235” 
scheme, which provided supply-side subsidies for owner-occupied housing for low 
income households.  These households made means-tested payments towards 
mortgage costs, the balance of which was recovered from the US government 
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(Department of Housing and Urban Development – HUD) as subsidy.  The amount 
paid by the purchaser was a function of income only, unaffected by costs; so at the 
margin mortgage costs (a function of capital costs) were paid by HUD.  Over-stating 
capital costs thus increased the amount that could be claimed as subsidy.  Instances of 
this came to light in the course of audits, and the scheme was brought into disrepute.  
It was effectively discontinued in 1973, only five years after passage of the legislation 
that set it up (Housing Act 1968). 
 
The affordable housing scheme outlined in this paper is very different from the US 
“Section 235” scheme and would not be at risk in the same way.  It illustrates, though, 
the inherent tension between, on the one hand, getting affordable dwellings built in 
sufficient numbers, and on the other strict procedures to ensure effective targeting and 
value for public money.  A key policy question would be how relaxed to be about 
targeting and, at the margin, value for money, in order to get enough affordable 
houses built.  Market-specific financial modeling could provide insights into how to 
define the programme boundaries that would need to be specified in statue. 
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ANNEX 2c:  FURTHER DETAIL OF THE US LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT  
 
The following description is taken from McClure (2000): 
 
“Annual credits are granted against the costs of the buildings, site improvements, 
and equipment, which comprise most development expenses other than land cost.  
Credits are in the amount of about 9 percent of the depreciable costs of the new 
construction or substantial rehabilitation performed and about 4 percent of the 
acquisition cost.  These amounts are approximate and are adjusted monthly by the 
government to maintain the present value of the 10 years of credits at 70 percent 
of the cost of new construction or substantial rehabilitation and 30 percent of the 
acquisition cost.  The present value is calculated using a discount rate determined 
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
(…) 
 
Rents on the units against which credits are claimed must be determined 
according to affordability standard set for the metropolitan area.  These rents are 
based on what a family could afford if it paid 30 percent of its income for 
housing, including contract rent plus tenant-paid utility expenses.  These rents 
vary with the number of bedrooms in the unit.  What is important to note is that 
the allowed rents are based on metropolitan household income and expense 
criteria, not the income r utility expenses of the actual tenant residing in the unit.  
As a result, the program does not guarantee that an individual tenant household 
will not have to pay more than 30 percent of its income for rent, only that the rent 
will be held down to a level considered affordable by standards within the 
metropolitan area. 
(…) 
 
While the LIHTC program has many intricacies, its implementation tends to 
follow a relatively standard pattern.  Within each state, the administrative agency 
announces a round of funding.  Various developers, both for-profit and nonprofit 
entities, prepare proposals requesting tax credits for some or all of the units.  The 
state administrative agency selects the most meritorious developments on the 
basis of published criteria and awards them credits. 
 
If a development receives an award, the developer works to arrange the necessary 
financing to cover construction costs and to arrange the permanent financing to 
pay off construction loans when the project is completed.  Debt financing is 
placed with one or more lenders (private sector lenders, public sector lenders, or 
both).  At the same time, the developer seeks equity financing for the project.  
Usually, this is secured by bringing investors into a limited partnership that will 
own the property.  Investors will make periodic cash contributions through the 
construction period and, frequently, through the early years of project operation as 
well.  Contributions are given in exchange for the tax credits received over the 
first 10 years of operation.  In addition, the investors must pay for any or all of the 
other benefits of ownership, including any cash flow that may be experienced, 
any surplus depreciation generated by the development, and any residual value 
the property may have when it is sold.”  (McClure, pp. 92 – 94) 
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There are approximately 20 large syndicators that specialise in packaging LIHTC 
investments and marketing them to investors, who are mostly corporate.  “Most 
developers sell a substantial portion, typically 99%, of the equity ownership of credit 
developments to equity investors—to syndicators or big corporations, or occasionally 
to groups of local investors.”  (Hobart & Schwarz, p. 12)  The market was originally 
dominated by private investors investing in retail funds, but is now almost entirely 
made up of corporate investors. 
 
Developers normally do not rely on the LIHTC alone to provide affordable housing, 
but layer it with other subsidies.  This occurs because competition for the credits is so 
strong that states can insist on affordability levels much lower than the legal minima.   
“Where rents in LIHTC units are low and where construction and development costs 
are high (a combination found in most inner-city markets), the 9 percent credit rate is 
not enough to make a project financially feasible.” (McClure p. 112)  Most LIHTC-
funded projects required additional federal or state funding; some had five or more 
separate funding sources—on average, 46% of total development cost was covered by 
LIHTC equity, 38% by a first mortgage, and 16% by gap financing.  (Cummings & 
DiPasquale p. 258).  Even so, the program is used in approximately 35% of newly 
constructed rental units nationally (Hobart & Schwarz, p. 5); the percentage of newly 
constructed affordable rental units is not given, but is clearly much higher. 
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